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EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS: LIMITS ON
COLLABORATION AS THE BASIS FOR FLEXIBLE
REGULATION
MARK SEIDENFELD*
INTRODUCTION
By many accounts, the United States regulatory system is at a
crossroads. Federal regulation is lambasted as pervasive, unduly
burdensome, and inefficient, even as the American public clam-
ors for increased protection against threats from sources such as
toxic substances, bacterially tainted meat, and airplane crashes.
Politicians,' academics,2 and p6pularizers of criticism of the
regulatory state3 tell us that if the federal administrative gov-
ernment is to serve the interests of the public effectively, we
must reinvent that government.
According to proponents of "reinvention," the key to effective
reform is empowering all stakeholders-regulated entities, ad-
ministrators, and intended beneficiaries alike-in a collaborative
* Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I owe thanks to Rob
Atkinson, Ian Ayres, Jody Freeman, Bill Funk, Daniel Gifford, Walter Kamiat, Jim
Rossi, and the FSU faculty who attended the workshop at which I presented this
Article, for critical discussions and comments on previous drafts that improved the
Article immensely. I am also indebted to Avner Ben Gera, Sharman Green, Martha
Mann, Steven Johnson and Laurie Dietz for their dedicated research assistance, and
to the Florida State University College of Law for funding my research.
1. See, e.g., AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORIANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERN-
MENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS: STATUS REPORT (1994) (describing the
Clinton Administration's efforts to improve governmental efficiency).
2. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRAN-
SCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4-6 (1992); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Gover-
nance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997).
3. See generally, e.g., PHILIP K HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How
LAW Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (alleging that the government has created laws
devoid of common sense); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERN-
MENT. HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(1993) (outlining an effective approach to tap the power of the entrepreneurial pro-
cess and the free market to create a more efficient government).
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regulatory endeavor.4 As part of that tripartite endeavor, the
very entities subject to regulatory compulsion should engage in
the design of rules that will dictate their conduct, self-monitor-
ing for compliance with those rules, and self-enforcement when
the entity discovers a violation of those rules. In addition,
groups of individuals who share more diffuse interests in the
regulatory endeavor than do regulated entities-public interest
groups representing purported beneficiaries of the statutes au-
thorizing regulation-must be given equal power in the regula-
tory mechanism. Allowing public interest groups to assert appro-
priate institutional checks can reinforce cooperative interaction,
rather than adversarial behavior, between such groups, regulat-
ed entities, and the agency charged with implementing the regu-
latory statute.5
In essence, those calling for collaborative regulation see a
need to restructure the fundamental regulatory institutions of
the United States. Since the New Deal, government's role in
regulation has been to exercise informed discretion in setting
and applying standards in order to achieve some conception of
the public interest.6 Reinventors would alter the role of govern-
ment from dictator of rules to facilitator of accords by
stakeholders in particular regulatory matters. Government
would be one of many interested groups, and would be discour-
aged from exercising independent judgment about what the
public interest entails and how best to achieve it. Thus,
reinventors of government seek a fundamental change in the
very nature of the regulatory state.
I have always been skeptical, however, of claims that collabo-
ration can provide a workable structure for the regulatory state
4. See AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYS-
TEMS 29-30 (1993) (advocating negotiated rulemaking); Freeman, supra note 2, at 22
(describing five requirements for collaborative governance).
5. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 71.
6. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 60-62 (1988) (describing the New Deal conception of expert agencies
pursuing the public interest). Compare id. at 63-75 (noting developments in adminis-
trative law aimed at promoting interest group representation and judicial review to
allay concerns that agencies do not pursue disinterestedly the public interest), with
JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 58-62 (1978) (noting the New Deal's emphasis on political
independence to ensure agency pursuit of the public interest).
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outside of particular regulatory contexts that may be conducive
to such collaboration. This Article evaluates the potential for
reinvention to empower stakeholders to cure the regulatory ills
of the country by borrowing institutional sociological under-
standings of interest group structures and dynamics. It con-
cludes that the proponents of regulatory reinvention have over-
stated that potential. This Article does not advocate the elimina-
tion of efforts to experiment with collaborative approaches, but
rather suggests that such experimentation should occur on a
facility-by-facility basis, in situations characterized by partici-
pants who form a community of individuals with some common
interests, and in which those participants who represent the
interests of stakeholders in the regulatory process are account-
able to those stakeholders.
The Article begins by reviewing the impetus for the stakehold-
er empowerment movement, noting along the way some weak-
nesses in the mechanisms reformers propose to encourage collab-
orative decision fnaking. Next, it describes the structure and
dynamics of various interest group typologies and proceeds to
discuss pathologies of those internal dynamics that threaten to
disable collaborative regulatory processes. The Article next eval-
uates the extent to which three collaborative mechanisms that
the federal government recently created-negotiated regulation,
citizen suits for penalties for rule violations, and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's Project XL-have successfully over-
come the disabilities threatened by interest group dynamics.
Despite finding overwhelming praise for each of these empower-
ing mechanisms, my analysis indicates that none of them imple-
ment what I term a "truly collaborative regulatory process"-one
in which (1) the participants seek true consensus as a means of
resolving issues, rather than using the process to create strate-
gic advantages vis-A-vis other stakeholders in a larger or longer-
lasting interactive process; and (2) representatives of every in-
terest shared by a significantly affected group of similarly situ-
ated stakeholders are included. Moreover, I conclude that these
programs are unlikely to be panaceas for the problems that
plague the current administrative state because they can suc-
ceed in overcoming the adversarial propensities of at least some
stakeholders only within narrow regulatory environments. Final-
41320001
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ly, the Article relies on its abstract description of interest group
dynamics, and the lessons from those collaborative mechanisms
that have been tried, to identify the particular conditions under
which stakeholder empowerment is likely to result in stable and
constructive regulatory collaboration. At a minimum, these con-
ditions require that the collaborative regulatory endeavor in-
volve issues of a local nature, and that it occur within a commu-
nity of interest groups willing to cooperate. In addition, the
process must allow the mainstream of regulatory beneficiaries to
exclude participation by fringe groups who may have an ideolog-
ical as well as organizational interest in subverting the process.
These conditions for success impose significant barriers to the
use of collaborative regulation, and hence reinforce my conclu-
sion that, although collaborative regulation is a useful arrow in
the quiver of regulatory reform, its potential to cure current
regulatory ills is more confined than proponents suggest.
I. THE ROOTS OF THE EMPOWERMENT MOVEMENT
With the collapse of belief in the disinterested expertise of ad-
ministrative agencies,7 administrative law recognized a need to
allow putative beneficiaries of regulation access to administra-
tive proceedings to protect their interests.8 The administrative
state became an arena within which representatives of various
interests battle for regulation that serves individuals sharing
those interests.9 The purpose of the regulatory process is not to
implement a government-defined conception of the public good,
but rather to supply benefits demanded by groups on behalf of
their members' private interests.'0 One weapon in this battle
7. See FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 46-47; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682-83 (1975).
8. See SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 45. See generally Stewart, supra note 7, at
1711-56 (examining the judicial effort to provide better representation for a broader
range of interests).
9. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (describing pluralist theory and its application to
the administrative state).
10. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982) (comparing how regulation provides benefits to the pluralist
theory's assumption that regulation will correct market imperfections or provide
public goods); Croley, supra note 9, at 31-33. For discussions of various reasons why
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entails, at the day-to-day level, the ability to tie-up agency re-
sources needed to respond to comments and petitions, which
demand such response because they are backed up by threats of
judicial review.' When necessary, interest groups can threaten
use of the ultimate weapon-their ability to mobilize political
support in Congress for the group's position. The theory of inter-
est group representation asserts that if the battlefield is level,
the pressures each interest group bring to bear on a regulatory
issue, and hence the ultimate outcome, will be proportional to
the collective importance various stakeholders in the debate
placed on the particular issue before the implementing agency.1
Traditionally, regulated entities, whose property or contract
rights were affected directly by regulatory actions, had access to
agency proceedings and the right to seek judicial review of agen-
cy decisions.' 3 In order to level the field of administrative con-
frontation, representatives of so-called public interest groups,
acting on behalf of individuals for whom Congress purported to
have enacted regulatory statutes, had to be given a similar abili-
ty to provide input to agencies in a manner that the agency was
not free to ignore. 4 During the development of the interest
group understanding of the regulatory state,15 courts relaxed
access requirements to agency proceedings and to judicial review
of agency decisions.' 6 At the same time, Congress authorized
a pluralistic theory of democracy might favor delegation of policymaking discretion to
administrative agencies, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 92-98 (1985); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1, 74-77 (1994).
11. See SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 46-69.
12. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36-38 (1957)
(describing generally how the political system can be seen as a means of efficiently
distributing the benefits of regulation to interest groups); SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at
5-8, 14. Political scientists have developed a more general notion of pluralistic de-
mocracy, which views competition among interest groups as the best means of ap-
proximating the "public interest" that theoretically is distinct from the mere aggrega-
tion of private interests. See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNIT-
ED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 512-16 (1953).
13. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1723-24.
14. See id. at 1725.
15. See SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 45-48. See generally Stewart, supra note 7, at
1711-90 (discussing the expansion of the traditional model of administrative law).
16. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the courts mandated that
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members of the public to obtain almost any information in agen-
cy files and opened agency meetings to public scrutiny."7
Satisfaction with the interest group model of the administra-
tive state has never been universal. Public choice economists
accept the model's descriptive accuracy but note that govern-
ment regulators essentially control a monopoly on regulation,
which they can use to generate and distribute rents to those who
continue to support them.'" Many public choice theorists con-
clude therefore that the inevitability of self-interested political
behavior counsels severely constraining state regulatory authori-
ty.'9 Other scholars have questioned the normative theory of
agencies allow interested persons to intervene even in adjudicatory administrative
proceedings to which they were not a party. See, e.g., Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Also,
the courts liberalized standing to allow those who suffered injury in fact from an
agency decision, but who had no legal entitlement affected by an agency decision, to
petition for review of the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1970). Around the same time, the courts allowed re-
view of agency rules before the agency attempted to enforce those rules against any
entity. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-43 (1967). This equalized
the ability of beneficiaries and regulated entities to seek judicial review because,
without pre-enforcement review, a regulated entity that believed a rule was unrea-
sonably harsh could always force review of a rule by simply violating it and chal-
lenging the agency's application of the rule to the entity. Without pre-enforcement
review, however, beneficiaries of regulation who felt that a rule was too lenient on
regulated entities could never bring a challenge to the rule. See Mark Seidenfeld,
Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to
Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 117 (1997).
17. See Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
18. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. ECON. 807, 809-12 (1975) (modeling efforts to obtain regulatory approval, such
as licenses, as competition to obtain a monopoly); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3-6 (1971) (arguing that in-
dustry seeks regulation to obtain benefits that only the government can supply, such
as legal restrictions on entry into the industry); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUB-
LIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 229-46 (1989) (describing the
theory of rent-seeking behavior and its application to the regulatory and more gener-
al political process); Croley, supra note 9, at 36-37 (describing public choice theory of
regulation as premised on analogy of the government regulatory process to private
markets, but also recognizing the distinction between such markets and the regulato-
ry process).
19. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, GEo. MASON L. REV.,
Winter 1988, at 5, 6 ("We should . . . strive to create institutions that prevent the
20001 EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS 417
democracy from which the model derived-pluralistic democra-
cy-because an uneven distribution of resources in society would
bias the outcome in the political arena toward those who already
have wealth and power regardless of the rules governing access
to proceedings and information.2 ° Scholars in diverse fields are
also skeptical of the model's assumptions that interest groups
pursue members' private interests narrow-mindedly and exclu-
sively.2 ' They cite examples of political behavior that cannot be
explained if one assumes that individuals acting in their politi-
cal capacity rationally maximize their utility.22 Finally, commu-
nitarian critics assail pluralism because of its assumption that
political conduct should be self-interested.2 ' These critics fear
that the interest group model legitimates conduct aimed at se-
curing private benefits and dismisses concerns about conceptions
public officials who wield the monopoly of physical power from turning that power
on their defenseless citizenry."); James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public
Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CON-
STITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 26 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds.,
1988); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (1991) (noting that acceptance of public choice theorists
has resulted in a push for deregulation).
20. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEmoCRACY 399-403 (1986) (noting the inequality of influence that is tied
in some ways to differences in resources available to different interest groups); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 1511, 1535 (1992) (describing distortions in the political process that can result
from the differences in wealth and power of various interest groups).
21. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 95 (1982) (contending that ideology plays a role in politi-
cal choices that distinguishes such choices from those of consumers in ordinary mar-
kets); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theo-
ry of Politics, AM. ECON. REV., June 1984, at 279, 298 (reporting empirical evidence
that ideology is an important influence on legislators' decisions); Gregory B. Markus,
The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote:
A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis, 32 AM. J. POL. SCi. 137, 151-52 (1988) (reporting
evidence suggesting that the state of the national economy has greater influence on
voting for the president than do the voters' personal economic interests).
22. Perhaps the most fundamental conundrum facing public choice theory is its
inability to explain why any people vote in general elections. See FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 19, at 24-25; Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2138-46 (1996) (rejecting as implausible or tautological any rational
choice explanation for why people vote).
23. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1544-45 (1988).
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of the public good and the moral fabric of the political communi-
ty.2 4 For these critics, the interest group model encourages ad-
versarial proceedings, and thereby forfeits the opportunity for
more cooperative and consensus based regulation.
One can view many of the recent proposals for altering the
empowerment of regulatory beneficiaries as attempts to define a
regulatory model based on interest group participation that
avoids the traditional model's prescription of pursuit of self-in-
terest and adversarial relationships between the groups.25 Re-
formers call for "collaborative regulation," by which they mean
involvement of all stakeholders in a deliberative common ven-
ture of solving problems that plague activities of regulated enti-
ties.26 By reorienting stakeholders to view others as compatriots
in the problem-solving endeavor, reformers of the interest group
model hope that both regulated entities and public interest
group representatives will eschew strategic conduct that has
dominated their interaction on regulatory matters over the past
thirty years.2" One significant means for reorienting public inter-
est groups away from their historically adversarial posture
would grant such groups access to the regulatory process prior to
the point when various interests become wedded to positions
and internalize a conception of the regulatory system as "us
against them."28 By granting such access at a point when even a
controversial issue can be characterized as a problem in need of
24. See id. at 1550-51 (advocating that civic virtue, rather than self-interest,
should motivate political decisions).
25. See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations
in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 655, 655-56 (characterizing regulato-
ry proceedings as "a zero-sum game in which lawyer-mercenaries battle in an inter-
est group struggle from which only the lawyers profit").
26. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, THE ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER
WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE ENVIRONMENT at v-vi (1996); Freeman, supra
note 2, at 6; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An In-
terpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1631-32 (1985); see also infra note 44 (acknowl-
edging the derivation of the term).
27. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 23-24; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regula-
tions: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 (1982); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754, 795-801 (1984) (advocating involvement of parties to a legal
dispute in a problem-solving endeavor as a means of overcoming intransigence and
refusal to relate to the needs of others).
28. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 22.
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a solution, and thereby engaging affected individuals in delibera-
tion about the issue, regulators can harness the administrative
process to induce stakeholders to be more empathetic to the
concerns of others affected by the regulations at issue, and ulti-
mately more open to public-regarding solutions to regulatory
problems.29
For example, reformers' efforts prompted Congress to enact
provisions authorizing and encouraging agencies to engage in
"negotiated rulemaking," which brings together regulated enti-
ties and other stakeholders at the earliest stages of the consider-
ation of regulations.30 The hope of negotiated rulemaking is that
all stakeholders can cooperate and reach a consensus that takes
into account the values and concerns of each affected interest
group. 1 Further reforms to make the regulatory process less
adversarial might involve empowering stakeholders to cooperate
with regulated entities and regulators in establishing enforce-
ment plans for particular regulated entities and even allowing
public interest groups some role in monitoring compliance.
Again, Congress has already started down this road to empower-
ment by providing for citizen suits in select statutes in order to
enforce violations of regulatory standards.32
One can also view the call for greater empowerment of regula-
tory beneficiaries as a means of avoiding some of the pitfalls of
industry self-regulation.33 Proponents of self-regulation would
depend on people's propensity to comply with regulations that
they perceive as a reasonable means of avoiding many of the
inefficiencies of traditional regulation.3 Perceptions of the rea-
29. See Reich, supra note 26, at 1636-37.
30. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994).
31. See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No.
82-4), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1983); Harter, supra note 27, at 28-31.
32. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (1994).
33. Cf Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State,
32 TULSA L.J. 325 (1996) (noting that regulatory flexibility may involve voluntary
(i.e., self) regulation, but that such regulation will require an increase in regulators'
discretion, and critically examining how such an increase fits within current under-
standings of administrative law).
34. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOM: THE
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sonableness of regulations, and the concomitant propensity of
individuals to comply with such regulations, however, depend in
turn on a trust that regulated entities will enforce the rules
fairly and sensibly.35 The potential, however, for groups repre-
senting the interests of regulatory beneficiaries to override
agreements between regulators and regulatees, either by directly
suing for penalties under citizen suit provisions or by politically
forcing the agency to take a tougher stand than it had negotiat-
ed with the regulated industry, creates uncertainty that can
undermine development of the requisite trust. A regulated entity
is unlikely to share information and admit to regulatory viola-
tions if it believes that political pressure might force adminis-
trators to renege on deals not to use such information to penal-
ize the entity severely. Moreover, even if such trust developed,
under current doctrines of administrative law, representatives of
regulatory beneficiaries can interfere with the implementation of
self-regulation by challenging self-designed rules and perhaps
even enforcement policies worked out between the agency and
the entities.36 Finally, for many regulatory programs, the de-
velopment of self-regulatory approaches will require congressio-
nal authorization. 7 To the extent that putative beneficiaries of
regulation are excluded from the cooperative venture between
regulated entities and the regulatory agency, they are apt to
oppose such ventures. One should not expect Congress to autho-
rize self-regulation in the face of strong opposition from public
interest groups representing members' interests.
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 58-66, 92 (1982) (attributing the un-
reasonableness of much regulation to its counterfactual assumption that entities will
avoid complying with rules unless threatened with legal sanctions for violations); JAY
A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNA-
TIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION 99 (1988); Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Imple-
mentation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535, 542-43 (1996) (noting
that if the government expects voluntary compliance, the rules must be perceived as
reasonable).
35. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 73-81 (1990); Robert A.
Kagan & John T. Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory En-
forcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 75-76 (Keith Hawkins & John
M. Thomas eds., 1984).
36. See infra notes 202-34 and accompanying text.
37. See Michael, supra note 34, at 565-66 (noting the dependence of a self-regu-
latory meat inspection program on statutory authorization).
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A second concern of some of the more sophisticated advocates
of cooperative regulation is the potential for capture inherent in
a cooperative regulatory system.18 Viewed as a two-person sys-
tem, a cozy environment between the regulating agency and
regulated entities conduces co-option of the administrative appa-
ratus to serve the ends of the entities rather than society as a
whole. 9 Thus, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite advocate empow-
erment.of public interest groups to prevent capture that might
result from cooperation between agency inspectors and regulated
entity personnel.4" Allowing public interest groups to participate
in agency proceedings on an equal footing with regulated enti-
ties and regulators raises the stakes for a firm attempting to
capture regulators.41 To succeed in making the regulatory sys-
tem a tool for its private gain, the firm will also have to capture
participating interest groups.42 As Ayres and Braithwaite note,
one cannot credibly conceive of a firm offering to buy off an
interest group leader like Ralph Nader.'
Concerns about regulated entities abusing the trust inherent
in a cooperative regulatory scheme lead to calls for what
amounts to collaborative regulation44-a variant of self-regula-
38. See AYRES & BRAITHWA1TE, supra note 2, at 71. Classic capture scenarios, in
which an industry co-opts an agency's entire regulatory program, rarely occurs in
today's environment of competing interest groups. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAU-
CRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 83-88 (1989); see
also PAUL J. Qum, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 164-74
(1981) (suggesting that various mechanisms thought to promote capture, such as hir-
ing of agency staff by industry, do not do so). "Nonetheless, within niches of an
agency's policy domain, firms in regulated industries and interest groups with strong
central staffs still occupy a favored position in regulatory and political structures
that allows them an advantage in influencing agency decisions." Mark Seidenfeld,
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51
ADmiN. L. REV. 429, 464 (1999).
39. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 63-71.
40. See id. at 71-73.
41. See id. at 73.
42. See id,
43. See id. ("There exist individuals who for all practical purposes are incorrupt-
ible and immune to all available forms of capture.").
44. I borrow this term from Jody Freeman. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 4
(labeling this approach to regulation as "collaborative governance"). Others have used
other descriptive terms to describe the same idea. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWArTE,
supra note 2, at 71 (labeling empowerment of regulatory beneficiaries "[tiripartism");
THE ASPEN INSTITrrTE, supra note 26, at 9 (describing its proposal as "The Alterna-
4212000]
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tion in which beneficiaries of regulatory statutes are empowered
to participate in regulatory design and enforcement. If such
empowerment is to deter undue influence by regulated entities,
which in the context of cooperative regulatory interaction might
lead to sweetheart deals, the regulatory system will have to
grant these interest groups authority commensurate with that
accorded regulated entities under self-regulation programs. Oth-
erwise, regulated firms and regulators could work around objec-
tions of public interest groups. For example, if public interest
groups were involved in the collaborative design of standards,
but not enforcement, an agency could promulgate a rule that
seemingly gave effect to interest group goals, but simply fail to
enforce violations of the rule.
The mechanisms for granting representatives of beneficiaries
commensurate power in the regulatory process depend on the
opportunities those subject to regulation have to influence the
process. If regulated entities have the ability to design the stan-
dards to which they are subject,45 they control the ultimate
structure of regulations; as long as the entities are willing to
accept the existing regulatory structure as the alternative, they
can prevent the introduction of any new regulation that they
find too burdensome or invasive simply by refusing to propose
such regulation. Commensurate power on the part of public in-
terest groups would be the authority to veto self-designed stan-
dards that the groups did not believe sufficiently protective of
their interests.46 With veto power, public interest groups too can
force the maintenance of the regulatory status quo over the
adoption of new collaborative rules.
If a regulatory scheme entails entities engaging in regulated
entity-enforcement of standards, these entities have significant
leeway in determining the bounds of regulatory standards when
the standards are applied.47 Generally, enforcement of a stan-
tive Path").
45. On the distinction between self-design and self-enforcement of regulation, see
Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regula-
tion in Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1994), describing as
two axes of self-regulation the power to set standards governing one's activity and
the power to enforce such standards.
46. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 71; Freeman, supra note 2, at 30.
47. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 219. The whole point of self-regu-
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dard involves a high degree of discretion about what conduct
constitutes a violation and whether to take official action in
response to questionable conduct.4" Even if the self-regulator's
enforcement decision is potentially subject to oversight by a
public official, the company has little incentive to construe regu-
lations strictly when it applies them to itself.49 Unless the agen-
cy overseer deems an entity's position regarding enforcement of
a standard to be "cheating" on the self-enforcement compact, the
agency is unlikely to seek penalties in response to the entity
taking that position.50 Thus, an entity usually will not face the
threat of an agency imposing significant penalties in response to
the entity construing a standard to benefit its own interests, so
long as its construction is not patently unreasonable. Moreover,
even if the agency alleges that such a construction represents an
attempt to cheat on the collaborative program, if penalties for
cheating are heightened significantly above those for inadvertent
noncompliance, a court reviewing the imposition of a sanction
often will hesitate to hold that honest disagreements about the
scope of a standard rise to the level of bad faith.5 The bottom
lation, after all, is to allow those with the knowledge of the company's operation to
use discretion to avoid unnecessarily burdensome regulations. See id.
48. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regu-
latory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 35, at 3, 13.
49. One exception is for performance-based standards whose violation might
result in negative ramifications to the company in the marketplace. See Michael,
supra note 34, at 569 (noting that the meat processing industry supports a recently
proposed hazard analysis critical control point system of self-regulation, despite the
costs it will impose on the industry, because "the industry wants all its products
perceived as safe"). In that situation, however, the incentives for the company to
comply are extralegal, and exist even in the'absence of any regulation. Hence, self-
regulation in that context would not provide the incentive for compliance.
50. Cf Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organiza-
tional Life, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 35, at 23, 34 (noting that regula-
tory violations usually entail violations of trust and hence are addressed more appro-
priately by compliance-based means of enforcement, i.e., bargaining to ensure compli-
ance). By cheating, I mean a failure to engage in self-enforcement in good faith. An
isolated, unreported violation of a standard would constitute noncompliance with the
standard that must be corrected, but would not in itself constitute evidence of cheat-
ing. See Robert A. Kagan, On Regulatory Inspectorates and Police, in ENFORCING
REGULATION, supra note 35, at 37, 46 (noting that most often regulators will not
perceive of a business entity that violates a regulatory prohibition as bad); cf Reiss,
supra, at 22 (stating that under compliance-based enforcement systems "[a] penalty
is resorted to when and only when it signals the termination of [an enforcement]
negotiation").
51. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970, 975 (10th Cir.
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line is that entities have little to deter them from ignoring con-
duct that only arguably comprises a violation of a regulation.
To counterbalance the discretion of the regulated entities to
construe standards in their self-interest, Congress or the agency
administering the program must empower public interest groups
independently to enforce regulatory standards. 2 Such empower-
ment allows a public interest group to bring to judicial attention
conduct that, although not a clear rule violation, the group be-
lieves violates standards. By so empowering public interest
groups, a tripartite regulatory scheme substitutes the public
interest groups for the agency as the backstop to self-enforce-
ment gone awry.5 3 This saves money for the public fisc and al-
lows disputes about the precise scope of regulatory standards to
be resolved in adjudicatory contests regarding particular viola-
tions, thereby obviating the need for the agency to allege that
entities have cheated in order to raise the issue of the scope of
the standard. Thus, such empowerment might preserve a cli-
mate for agency-entity cooperation by preventing disputes about
the scope of standards from escalating into disputes about the
good faith of the entity's enforcement efforts.
Even in the context of traditional government enforcement of
government designed regulations, regulated entities enjoy a
privileged position to negotiate the reach of regulations to which
1992) (asserting that good faith violations of Department of Labor regulations that
do not endanger the safety of miners would not be grounds for penalties under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act), affd sub nom. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
52. Statutory provisions in many environmental statutes that authorize citizens
to enjoin regulatory violations, although premised on the need to check agency cap-
ture, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 193 (1992), or lax agency enforcement, see
Marcia R. Gelpe & Janis L. Barnes, Penalties in Settlements of Citizen Suit Enforce-
ment Actions Under the Clean Water Act, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1025, 1025-26
& n.3 (1990), also provide a check against self-interested self-enforcement by regu-
lated entities.
53. Cf. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34
BUFF. L. REv. 833, 836-37 (1985) (explaining that citizen suits hold the potential to
go beyond merely inducing adequate government enforcement; they are "the means
of seeking a major-perhaps permanent-realignment of roles and powers in impor-
tant areas of regulation: the creation of 'private attorneys general' with responsibili-
ties comparable to those of the public attorney general").
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they are subject. Entities are free to seek waivers from or benefi-
cial constructions of standards after they are adopted.' An enti-
ty can force the agency to resolve a dispute about the reach of a
regulation by engaging in questionable conduct and waiting to
see if the agency will enforce the regulation against such con-
duct.55 Even if the agency decides to enforce the regulation, the
entity still has an opportunity to negotiate a settlement.56 To
counterbalance the ability of entities to get a second bite at the
apple of negotiating the reach of regulatory standards, collabora-
tive programs must empower public interest groups to challenge
agency decisions not to enforce a standard against particular
conduct by a regulated entity. Such a challenge allows the public
interest group a second chance to negotiate with the agency
about the scope of the standard, without allowing the interest
group directly to impose costs on the regulated entity.57
Regardless of the underlying structure of the collaborative
regulatory endeavor, empowerment of public interest groups
would require that they have access to all relevant information
that the industry has in its possession. Without such informa-
tion, public interest groups cannot easily determine what is at
stake in any regulatory debate. Perhaps more importantly, pub-
lic interest groups will be unable to determine whether regulato-
ry cooperation between regulators and a regulated entity is in
54. See Alfed C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278 (stating that flexibility in the exer-
cise of "requests for exceptions to regulatory legislation or to agency rules" is often-
times "necessary").
55. See Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 93 (noting that beneficiaries of rules, unlike
regulated entities "cannot simply refuse to comply with the rule and be assured of
an opportunity to raise their challenge in a post-enforcement proceeding").
56. See Laura Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Implementation, Negotiation and
Compliance in Environmental and Safety Regulation, 47 J. POL. 854, 862 (1985); see
also Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in
the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & SOCY REV. 735, 757-58 (1996) (noting that litigation
against an agency allows an interest group to negotiate with the agency in secret
about the scope of a rule).
57. As one proponent of empowerment characterizes regulatory enforcement, it is
a process by which "organizations bargain and negotiate rules rather than treat
them as constraints." JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY,
COMMMUNIT, BUREAUCRACY 197 (1986). Given that characterization, Handler suggests
that there "be bargaining with social movement groups as well as [regulators] cli-
ents." Id
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fact undertaken in good faith rather than reflecting a sweetheart
deal with captured regulators. Public interest group leaders are
unlikely to develop trust in the other participants in a collabora-
tive regulatory program if they always need to be wary of reg-
ulated entities and regulators taking advantage of information
to which the leaders are not privy.
For empowerment to work, information must flow not only to
group leaders who define how an interest group participates in
the regulatory process, but to group members as well. As my
analysis of the dynamics of interest groups will make evident,
the deviation of group leaders' interests from those of their
groups' members create agency costs. A group leader may be
more concerned with maintaining monetary support for the
group than delivering desired benefits to members. Yet experi-
ences of group members may not allow them to evaluate wheth-
er group leaders are maximizing the benefits that members
receive from belonging to the group because without detailed
information about various parties' actions in particular regulato-
ry proceedings, members cannot accurately assess alternative
strategies that leaders may have adopted.58 For example, if
group members incorrectly perceive regulated entities as intran-
sigent on basic issues, they may support efforts to obstruct the
regulatory process that they would not support if they knew that
reasonable compromise was possible.
58. In other words, benefits provided by interest groups often fall into the cate-
gory of goods economists call "credence goods." See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION:
LEGAL FoRM AND ECONOMC THEORY 133 (1994). For products that supply such
goods, even the experience of having used the product does not reveal the quality of
the product. See id.; Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Opti-
mal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973). In comments on an earlier
draft of this Article, Ian Ayres suggested that problems caused by the inability of
members to assess accurately the efforts of group leaders can be cured by having
competitors, i.e., other groups, make the relevant information known. Due to the na-
ture of group dynamics, however, competition between groups tends to fracture inter-
est groups and may actually contribute to the formation and stability of extreme
fringe groups that are likely to undermine collaborative regulatory endeavors. See
infra notes 70-80, 134-37 and accompanying text.
426 [Vol. 41:411
EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS
II. PATHOLOGIES IN PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP DYNAMICS
Achieving nonadversarial regulatory interactions by empower-
ing interest groups depends on the willingness of such groups to
cooperate with regulators and regulated entities. Cooperation
can create surplus that can be shared between group members,
regulated entities, and the government. Surplus can result when
everyone affected by the conduct to be regulated prefers some
change in the status quo, albeit that different groups of affected
individuals entertain different ideal regulatory outcomes.
Whether by compromise or collaborative development of creative
solutions, cooperative groups can reach an accord that creates
benefits for all affected. 59
Cooperative solutions to regulatory problems, however, do not
necessarily result just because such solutions benefit everyone
vis-A-vis the status quo. As the simple two-person prisoners'
dilemma reveals, individuals acting in rational pursuit of their
self-interest may be unable to reach or enforce cooperative
agreements and therefore the outcome of their conduct may be
suboptimal for each person.6" By a similar dynamic, if interest
group representatives pursue members' preferred outcomes too
zealously, they forego cooperative outcomes and thereby forfeit
such surplus and hurt their members' interests. Society as a
whole can also forfeit surplus if a single group of affected indi-
viduals may dictate the outcome of the regulatory "game."6
Thus, the benefits of cooperation can also be lost by the flip side
of overzealous pursuit of members' interests-the possibility that
group leaders will sell out to regulated entities, or alternatively
that leaders will be co-opted by the regulators. If leaders do not
pursue members' preferred positions with enough zeal, and regu-
lated entities can capture regulators, the resulting regulatory
59. See John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory
Enforcement, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 179, 182-85 (1984).
60. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994); MARK
SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 85-86 (1996); see
also Scholz, supra note 59, at 185-87 (modeling regulatory enforcement as a prisoners'
dilemma).
61. This potential for lost surplus again can be illustrated by the prisoners'
dilemma. Note that in such a game, social surplus is not maximized by maximizing
the benefit derived by any one player. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 60, at 86.
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scheme can benefit such entities at the expense of society as a
whole.
Unfortunately, for those who view empowerment of public
interest groups as a means of fostering nonadversarial relation-
ships among stakeholders or alternatively as a means of achiev-
ing regulatory reasonableness (and thereby flexibility), the inter-
nal structure and dynamics of interest groups can impede the
achievement of these goals.62 Group leaders have incentives for
forming a group, and group members for joining it, that may
undermine the willingness of a public interest group to cooper-
ate in a collaborative regulatory scheme, even when cooperation
is best for the members' interests." In other situations, incen-
tives facing group leaders, especially leaders of groups with
nontraditional group structures and sources of funds, raise the
likelihood that the groups will be co-opted by regulators with
whom they deal, or in rare instances even captured by the regu-
lated entities whose activities directly affect the interest of
group members.
A. The Definition of Public Interest Group
Before describing the internal structures and dynamics of
"public interest groups," that phrase must be defined. For the
purposes of this discussion, "public interest group" means a
group that states as its aim the use of group resources to pro-
vide benefits to members who share a diffuse interest in particu-
lar regulatory matters. Essentially, this definition includes all
political groups that represent the interests of individuals who
otherwise would not have means or a sufficient stake in regula-
tory matters to get involved personally in their resolution.' This
62. I focus on the structure and dynamics of interest groups because the social
sciences' answers to questions about interest group dynamics provide a framework of
knowledge that by necessity informs the legal debate. See Carol A. Heimer & Arthur
L. Stinchcombe, Elements of the Cooperative Solution: Law, Economics and the Other
Social Sciences, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 421, 422 (stating that before one can ask ques-
tions from the disciplines of economics and law, one must "know something about
the constitution and identity of the groups and individuals that can decide on and
pursue ends effectively").
63. See Michael T. Hayes, The New Group Universe, in INTEREST GROUP POLU-
Tics 133, 142 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986).
64. These are groups whose interests, under the traditional model of adminis-
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definition excludes groups of entities subject directly to regulato-
ry edicts backed by the coercive power of the state-those whose
conduct is restricted by the statute enabling agency implementa-
tion or by agency rules and orders. Usually such entities have
the opportunity and incentive to defend against adjudicatory ac-
tions the agency takes against them, even if they do not always
have sufficient resources to participate up-front in the
rulemaking that sets the standards to which they are subject.
My definition includes what many would characterize as private
interest groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce or groups
representing small farmers seeking government subsidies.65
Their inclusion, however, reflects the understanding that such
groups often are the putative beneficiaries of regulatory
schemes, and that their members' interests may be affected by
and need protection from the conduct of other entities that are
subject directly to regulation.
B. Problems Caused by Nontraditional Structures of Public
Interest Groups
Literature on public interest groups has characterized the
traditional interest group-the pure membership group-as the
archetype of public interest groups.66 In the pure membership
trative government, were to be represented by the agency pursuant to a statute
purporting to provide some regulatory benefits for those sharing these interests. As
noted earlier, the rise of the interest group model of the administrative state led
courts to allow these groups access to agency proceedings and judicial review to
assert interests on their own behalf. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
65. To a large degree, my definition of a public interest group comports with
what the literature calls "citizen groups." See Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Mobilization
of Political Interests in America, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PA-
TRONS, .PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 33-34 (Joel D. Aberbach et al. eds.,
1991) [hereinafter MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS] (defining citizen group). My admin-
istrative law perspective, however, leads me to focus on the nature of the interest
represented, and therefore not necessarily to exclude groups that represent other
organizations that would not have the means or incentives to participate directly in
the regulatory process.
66. See, e.g., INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 63. My typology of interest
groups describes idealized group structures. Actual interest groups do not fit these
structures perfectly; rather, they exhibit characteristics of the several group types to
different degrees. Nonetheless, the discussion of ideal types clarifies the problems
created by the various characteristics of real groups.
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group, leaders use their organizational talents and charisma to
form a group of members who share a common interest about a
regulatory matter. Funding for such groups comes from the
members.6" The group is organized with chapters that allow
face-to-face interaction between members. 8 Chapter representa-
tives regularly meet with central leaders and communicate rank
and file members' concerns to that leadership. The archetype as-
sumes that group leaders will diligently serve the interests of
the members as reflected in communications from chapter repre-
sentatives and feedback provided by individual members' deci-
sions whether to exit the group.69
Today, the complexity and breadth of many regulatory issues
fuels the formation of groups that deviate significantly from the
pure membership archetype. Group members are not homoge-
neous in their opinion about the matters that prompt them to
join the interest group.v Groups differ in their sources of fund-
ing, the opportunities they provide for face-to-face interaction
between members, and ultimately in their propensity to pursue
members' interests rather than broader social interests or inter-
ests of the group leaders.71
The mass membership group is one alternative to the as-
sumed archetype.72 Mass membership groups derive their fund-
67. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 137 (denoting pure membership groups as
"[mass-membership [giroups," a designation I use for an alternative group type).
68. See id. at 135, 137.
69. Exit takes on particular significance for pure membership groups because
such groups obtain funds from membership dues. Consequently, leaders of such
groups have an economic, as well as social, incentive to ensure that their activities
comport with group members' preferences. See Cary Coglianese, Unequal Representa-
tion: Membership Input and Interest Group Decision-Making (May 25, 1997) (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the 1996 meeting of the American Political Science
Association, on file with author). Coglianese reports, however, only a weak correla-
tion between a group's percentage of funding derived from membership dues and the
extent to which group leaders consult members. See id. at 8.
70. This is especially true of interest groups that involve themselves in numer-
ous and wide ranging issues. See William P. Browne, Policy and Interests: Instability
and Change in a Classic Issue Subsystem, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note
63, at 183, 193 (noting that such multipurpose groups are characterized in part "by
their heterogeneous memberships, supporters, and political contacts").
71. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 138-40; Coglianese, supra note 69, at 3-6 (dis-
cussing the likely effects of group structures on group leaders' propensity to consult
with members before formulating public positions).
72. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 137.
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ing primarily from members, but members have no opportunity
for face-to-face interaction.7" Thus, group leaders make most
decisions about regulatory positions the group will take without
much influence by members.74 The positions taken by mass
membership groups therefore may deviate significantly from
those that best serve their members' interests; depending on the
personal motivations of the group leaders, the group may take a
more or less than optimally zealous position in regulatory inter-
actions. Members can exercise some influence by their opportu-
nity to exit the group, especially if there is competition between
various groups for members' dollars.75 Frequently, however,
members respond to psychic benefits that they derive from their
identification with the group when deciding whether to enter
and stay in a group.76 Also, members often make such decisions
73. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES
ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 177-78 (1986) (noting that although members fund
95% of the $5-6 million annual budget of Common Cause, other than monetarily,
only a small minority of its membership participates in the group).
74. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 139 (denoting such groups simply as "[miass
[oirganizations"). Common Cause, which receives almost all its funds from small
contributions, and whose members interact only by electing a National Governing
Board, is an example of what I would consider predominately a mass membership
group. See About Common Cause (visited Nov. 22, 1999) <http://www.commoncause.
orglabout/faq.htm>. For a general discussion of the problem of remoteness of group
leaders from their membership, see MCCANN, supra note 73, at 181; Theda Skocpol,
Unravelling from Above, in TICKING TI4E BOMBS: THE NEW CONSERVATIVE ASSAULTS
ON DEMOCRACY 292, 300 (Robert Kuttner ed., 1996).
75. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 143 ("[Mlarket pressures ultimately may prove
more effective in forcing responsiveness to rank-and-file preferences than formally
democratic mechanisms."); see also JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY
56-57 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that competition for members leads group leaders to
focus on a narrow goal in order to distinguish the group from others with a similar
ideology).
76. See Constance Ewing Cook, Participation in Public Interest Groups: Member-
ship Motivations, 12 AM f. POL. Q. 409, 417-18 (1984) (reporting that three types of
purposive benefits-policy commitment, feeling of civic duty, and sense of political
efficacy-motivate individuals to join public interest groups); Burdett A. Loomis &
Allan J. Cigler, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 63, at 1, 8 ("It is the nonmaterial incentives,
such as fellowship and self-satisfaction, that may encourage the proliferation of high-
ly politicized groups . . . ."); MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 65, at 48
(stating that in large memberships "annual dues represent a painless way [for mem-
bers to amplify] their ideological views and [gain] a sense of involvement in the
national political process"); see also TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTER-
ESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 118
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without full knowledge of the group's operations or the precise
positions it takes on issues. These imperfections in members'
decisions about whether to exit the group may induce leaders to
take extreme positions in order to generate publicity.7" Thus, al-
though in theory competition among groups for members should
constrain against group leaders advocating extreme positions
that do not best serve the interests of members, in actuality
imperfections in the "market" for interest representation may
cause competition to exacerbate rather than mollify leaders'
extremist tendencies.78 Competition also may fragment the
group into subgroups that take different positions.79 Such frag-
mentation can interfere with the ability of regulators, regulated
entities, and the interest groups to reach regulatory outcomes
acceptable to all.8" Most likely, some fringe subgroup will be un-
(1980) (noting that a group member may "derive a sense of satisfaction from the
very act of contributing, when he sees this as an act of support for goals in which
he believes").
77. See Browne, supra note 70, at 188 (noting that recruiting, retaining, and
raising revenue from members induces organizations to pursue creation of the
organization's image as unique and necessary, and to publicize the organization's
goals); see also Jeffrey W. Koch, Assessments of Group Influences, Subjective Political
Competence, and Interest Group Membership, 15 POL. BEHAv. 309, 322 (1993) (noting
that individuals are more likely to join a group representing interests of their self-
identified "reference group" if they perceive the interest group as influential); Terry
M. Moe, Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups, 43 J. POL. 531, 538 (1981)
(noting that group leaders can manipulate information to create an impression that
membership is an effective means of furthering the organization's political goals).
78. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
79. See Browne, supra note 70, at 187-88 (noting that "the range of different
and often competing groups throughout American government" can destabilize and
fragment traditional issue "subsystemi[s]"); Allan J. Cigler, From Protest Group to
Interest Group: The Making of American Agricultural Movement, Inc., in INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS, supra note 63, at 46, 51-52 (noting the interrelated nature of the
American Agricultural Movement, Inc.'s (AAM) need to compete with other groups
providing material benefits and its need "to retain the support of [its] intense, pro-
grammatic activists"); see also id. at 57-62 (describing how competition for support
by members with different interests led to a split in the AAM).
80. See Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis, Moving on: Interests, Power, and
Politics in the 1980s, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra note 63, at 303, 308-09
(noting that increased competition for influence within traditional "issue networks"
has resulted in "[riegulatory and redistributive politics [that] are not characterized
by compromise, accommodation and secrecy"); cf Browne, supra note 70, at 187-88
(asserting that competition between agricultural interest groups that induced the
fragmentation of these groups makes it "harder for government to decide on policy
choices").
EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS
satisfied with a negotiated outcome, and the subgroup's ability
to challenge the action may scuttle the whole cooperative regula-
tory venture.
Another nontraditional group structure is the subsidized
member group, which allows for face-to-face interaction by mem-
bers in chapters, but receives much of its funding from sources
other than member contributions. 8 Members of such a group
have a mechanism for voicing their concerns, but the need to at-
tract outside funding creates incentives for leaders to compro-
mise members' interests. This structure is especially prevalent
among groups in their formative stages, when leaders must
depend on outside patronage for start-up funding.8 2 Such patron-
age can come from private philanthropies and government orga-
nizations, but is most likely to come from private institutions
and individuals who see the group as a means of furthering
their own institutional interests.83 If the interest group's position
deviates from the patron's interest, funding can vanish sudden-
ly, often with dire consequences for the -continued existence of
the group.8 Thus, leaders of subsidized groups are especially
susceptible to co-option by their patrons.
A third exception to the membership group archetype is the
central staff group.85 Essentially, these groups have no members.
A relatively small central staff engages in activities on behalf of
individuals with interest in regulatory matters who may have no
formal connection with the group." Such groups rely solely on
patronage or their own revenue-generating activities for their
funding, and have no governance or deliberative process for in-
put by those whom the group purports to represent.87 A central
81. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 139.
82. See id. at 140; David C. King & Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Origins and Main-
tenance of Groups, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 65, at 75, 78.
83. See King & Walker, supra note 82, at 82.
84. See id. at 99-100.
85. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 138.
86. See id.
87. See id Public interest law firms, which derive operating revenues from busi-
ness donations and grants from other foundations, epitomize groups in this category.
See generally Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984) (de-
scribing in detail the history and structure of numerous business-funded public inter-
est law firms). Groups that do have members, but generate a significant percentage
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staff makes decisions about group activities subject to influence
by the group's patrons. Often, central staff groups do not have
the political capital to influence political decision making. Thus,
such groups are apt to eschew collaborative deliberative process-
es for adversarial activity such as litigation.8" From the perspec-
tive of regulated firms, central staff groups are thus unattractive
as partners for cooperative regulatory ventures.
Analysis of the typology of interest groups thus reveals prob-
lems with reliance on such groups as moderating influences on
self-regulation. Leaders of nontraditional interest groups are
likely to deviate from the rational pursuit of members' interests:
when such groups are independent of outside sources of funds
leaders are apt to pursue members' preferred outcomes over-
zealously; when such groups are dependent on patronage, lead-
ers are apt to compromise such preferred outcomes.89
C. Problems with Representation by Pure Membership Public
Interest Groups
Even the internal dynamics of traditional pure membership
groups create impediments to cooperative behavior by such
groups in a collaborative regulatory scheme. Public interest
groups offer members three types of benefits: material benefits,
expressive or purposive benefits, and solidary benefits." Materi-
al benefits are particular goods or services provided to mem-
bers.9 The literature on interest groups often treats material
benefits as "selective," which means that they are limited to
members. 92 Because public interest groups seek to further dif-
of their revenues by litigating and settling citizen suits, such as the Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, see infra note 217 and accompanying text, manifest some of the
attributes of central staff groups.
88. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 138.
89. Cf. id. at 142 (asserting that "divergence between the views of leaders and
followers is particularly serious in view of the lack of real accountability within most
of the new citizens' groups").
90. See Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST
J. POL. SCI. 1, 15-16 (1969); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
33-35 (1973) (identifying a broader category of purposive benefits for achieving social
policy rather than the subset-expressive benefits-identified by Salisbury).
91. See WILSON, supra note 90, at 36; Salisbury, supra note 90, at 15.
92. See, e.g., PHILIP A. MUNDO, INTEREST GROUPS: CASES AND CHARACTERISTICS
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fuse interests, however, their participation in the regulatory
process frequently bestows material benefits on a general class
of individuals that includes nonmembers.9 3 Expressive benefits
are ideological positions taken by the interest group that satisfy
members' desire to speak out on the regulatory controversy in
which the group participates.14 Interest group expression obvi-
ates the need for each individual to participate directly, thereby
providing a benefit to any individual who agrees with the
group's stated position. Expressive benefits are collective rather
than exclusive goods; provision of the benefit to one individual
does not depreciate the value of the expression to others.95 Like
most collective goods, it is not selective, but rather can flow to
both group members and those outside the group. Finally, public
interest groups can provide solidary benefits. Members who are
active in the group gain a sense of belonging and companionship
by participating with other group members in a common endeav-
or or may derive social status from belonging to the group.96 For
groups that are not limited in membership, solidary benefits
usually flow only to group members who actively participate in
group events and decisions.
If an interest group provides predominantly selective material
benefits, then it may be logical to trust the group to cooperate
with administrators and firms in the regulatory endeavor. Grid-
lock caused by overzealous adversarialism denies the group
members a share of the surplus that can be realized by collabo-
rative regulation. Thus, although group empowerment can coun-
terbalance the influence of regulated entities, the group has a
21 (1992).
93. A prime example of a group delivering nonselective material benefits is a
"property-owners' association [obtaining] lower taxes." WILSON, supra note 90, at 38.
94. See Salisbury, supra notes 90, at 16. Salisbury distinguishes expressive bene-
fits from what Wilson calls purposive benefits. Compare id. (noting that expressive
benefits express viewpoints related to political goals, notwithstanding whether the
goals are achieved), with WILSON, supra note 90, at 45-47 (noting that purposive
viewpoints involve the actual achievement of the organization's political goals). In
most cases, members that derive expressive benefits from a group taking a position
also would derive purposive benefits if the group succeeded in having its position
adopted.
95. In microeconomic terms, collective goods are those whose consumption is
nonrivalrous. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 563 (9th ed. 1997).
96. See WILSON, supra note 90, at 39-40; Salisbury, supra note 90, at 16.
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similar incentive as such entities to implement improved regula-
tory structures and standards. Co-option is still a possibility,
however, because group leaders may gain personally by making
sacrifices to regulators that allow them to deliver some benefits
without working as hard for the group members' interests." Co-
option is especially likely when the group leaders interact with
government regulators on an ongoing, long-term basis, and the
membership does not have the means to monitor day-to-day
actions by group leaders.98
Unlike groups that provide primarily material benefits, groups
that provide mostly expressive and solidary benefits may not
have incentives to accommodate welfare-increasing regulatory
programs reasonably. Such groups generate and maintain sup-
port by adhering to ideological positions.99 "Members that join
groups of this kind do so in order to demonstrate their support
for certain collective values, and they expect the group to ad-
vance these concerns as vigorously as possible." 00 Acquiescence
undermines the extent to which members may feel that the
group has expressed their views. Moreover, the solidarity of ac-
tive members may depend on these members viewing the group
as the righteous underdog rather than a mainstream player in
the regulatory process.'
97. See HANDLER, supra note 57, at 243-44.
98. See id. at 243-44, 246 (describing the potential for co-option and asserting
that it can be avoided only by "introduction of new blood" into interest groups that
will ensure that group leaders remain responsive to the group's original mission).
99. See Stephen J. Driscoll, Note, Environmental Private Actions: Are Special
Interest Groups Hobbling Comprehensive Programs Without "Standing" Themselves?,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 469, 471-72 & n.10 (1993) (noting that special interest groups often
block all solutions to a problem and cannot overcome counterproductive refusals to
cooperate because "these groups operate under the auspices of a righteous cause");
see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evalu-
ation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.J. 1625, 1641 (1986) (positing that group leaders can secure financial support
by refusing to settle regulatory challenges); Stewart, supra note 25, at 674 ("[M]any
advocacy groups often have a strong ideological commitment to a cause; as a result,
such groups may be more likely to fight for their preferred outcome as a matter of
principle and less likely to accept compromise.").
100. Thomas L. Gais & Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influence in American
Politics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 65, at 103, 107. One scholar of
interest group member motivation found that many group members enjoy being part
of what they view as an ideological crusade. See Cook, supra note 76, at 409.
101. The tendency of active group members to support the group's obstructionist
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Formation of a public interest group often depends on the
group leader's ability to attract members to an uncertain
cause. 1 2 Outside of close communities of individuals who share a
common regulatory interest, groups tend to rely on patrons for
monetary support until the group can build a membership that
can support its activities.103 Hence most fledging public interest
groups are not pure membership groups."0 4 Even for those that
may be pure membership groups, leaders cannot credibly prom-
ise material benefits before a group is well-established, as an
interest group in its infancy often lacks the power to deliver
such benefits. Thus, when forming groups, leaders attract new
members by offering collective, purposive benefits rather than
selective, material benefits."0 5 In fact, many citizen groups begin
as protest groups." 6 To get the group off the ground, leaders rely
on the emotional appeal of expressive benefits and the solidary
benefits available to members who actively contribute to the
cause. The formation process for public interest groups thus
undermines development of structures that might induce a
group to cooperate in a regulatory scheme.
According to the rational choice based incentive theory of
interest groups, however, maintenance of a public interest group
requires that the group replace the expressive benefits it initial-
positions can be exacerbated further by individuals' propensity to conform to the
views of their fellow members. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 19-34 (7th
ed. 1995).
102. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37 (1982) (discussing the role of
"political entrepreneurship" in overcoming barriers to collective action that in theory
would impede group formation); MOE, supra note 76, at 36-38 (attributing creation
and maintenance of political interest groups to political and administrative leaders
who act as entrepreneurs in setting up a benefits package to sell to members); Salis-
bury, supra note 90, at 11-13 (proposing an exchange theory of" groups in which
[e]ntrepreneursorganizers invest capital to create a set of benefits which they offer
to a market of potential customers [i.e. group members]").
103. See King & Walker, supra note 82, at 75, 78.
104. See Hayes, supra note 63, at 141 ("Citizens' groups ... often find it virtu-
ally impossible to establish a network of local chapters at the outset.").
105. See Cigler, supra note 79, at 47 (stating that mobilization of a political inter-
est group requires identification of a problem and agreement about the need for
collective action); King & Walker, supra note 82, at 88 ("For attracting members,
citizen sector groups emphasize purposive benefits-which is to say collective
goods-more than any other class of benefits.").
106. See King & Walker, supra note 82, at 93.
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ly offered with material benefits to its members." 7 Once individ-
uals join the group, incentive theory posits that members are
attracted to other groups or simply exit the group and free ride
on its efforts if the group does not provide benefits to members
that others do not receive. 0 8 One might therefore conclude that,
in the long run, groups will tend toward those that provide ma-
terial benefits-precisely the groups likely to avoid overzealous
adversarialism.' °9 This conclusion is problematic on two counts.
First, empirical evidence contradicts the prediction of incen-
tive theory that mature groups maintain membership by offering
material benefits." Leaders of mature groups continue to accord
greater significance to purposive rather than material bene-
fits."' This empirical result may reflect the failure of incentive
theory to factor into its model of public interest group dynamics
information costs that members must incur to monitor group
leaders. Group members may be unaware of the details of ac-
tions taken by leaders in regulatory proceedings. By definition,
those who share a diffuse interest lack a strong incentive to
learn about the issues in which group leaders take positions.
Members are likely to evaluate the efficacy of leaders based on
the information they hear, which may depend on what leaders
include in newsletters to the group or what members hear
through mass media outlets.12 To the extent that members more
readily contribute financially to groups that they perceive as
actively pursuing their interests, the salience of group leaders'
107. See Cigler, supra note 79, at 48.
108. See id.; cf MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (theorizing that free rider problems create
barriers to formation of large interest groups that provide diffuse, nonselective bene-
fits).
109. Contrary to this prediction by incentive theorists, evolutionary theories of
oligarchy suggest that "older [groups] become less responsive to their members' con-
cerns." Coglianese, supra note 69. Coglianese's analysis, however, showed no signifi-
cant correlation between a group's age and the propensity of its leaders to seek
input from members. See id. at 8.
110. See King & Walker, supra note 82, at 75, 92.
111. See id. at 92 (noting that citizen group leaders "believe that the maintenance
of their organizations depends on their success as . . . advocates for a cause").
112. See Gai & Walker, supra note 100, at 103, 106 (noting the problem caused
by members getting information from the mass media).
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actions may matter more to the financial stability of the group
than to the actual congruence between positions taken by the
leaders with members' interests.11 3 Reports of strong stances
taken against adversaries may attract more attention, and
therefore more money, than reports of negotiated accommoda-
tions that actually provide group members a modicum of tan-
gible benefits. 14 Hence, information costs explain why the struc-
ture needed to attract capital in the formation stage may contin-
ue to predominate even in mature groups.
Second, even if the prediction that mature groups must switch
to provide selective benefits was accurate, new interest groups
are continually forming and dying. 15 At any given time, there is
likely to be some public interest group in the formative stage
promising to take an extreme position on regulatory issues in
order to attract members. Such groups fill a niche for those who
desire the expressive and solidary benefits that mature groups
may not provide. Thus, some existing groups will always threat-
en to challenge regulatory agreements reached by other
stakeholders. Faced with the potential of such unreasonable
challenges, firms will rationally hesitate to make available all
information about their plants and their self-regulatory efforts.
D. Empowerment as a Cure for Public Interest Group Pathologies
The arguments that public interest group pathologies will
seriously impede the success of empowerment as a means of
implementing regulatory flexibility is open to the criticism that
such pathologies reflect groups that historically have not been
empowered. Some proponents of empowerment contend that the
very act of empowering public interest groups will cure the ills
113. See id. at 103, 105 ("Groups with a farflung membership . .. are naturally
drawn toward controversial issues and tactics that will capture the attention of their
diffuse membership .. ").
114. See Perritt, supra note 99, at 1641 (noting that public interest groups may
have more incentive to litigate than to negotiate regulations because "publicity asso-
ciated with a dramatic victory and extreme statements made in litigation tend to
facilitate fund raising and other facets of membership support").
115. See King & Walker, supra note 82, at 99-100.
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that threaten cooperation by the empowered groups." 6 For them,
public interest groups currently "are likely to be supporters of
regulatory inflexibility and opponents of the regulatory discre-
tion needed to constitute win-win solutions precisely because
they are disempowered.""1 These proponents rely on three as-
pects of empowerment as countering the historical propensity of
interest groups to act adversarially." 8
First, it is possible that public interest groups act overzeal-
ously because groups that cannot deliver material benefits must
resort to provision of expressive and solidary benefits." 9 Propo-
nents of empowerment, however, see as "more durable, and
ultimately more persuasive, [the] appeal of tangible long term
progress towards goals that are important to their members." 2 °
Second, proponents note that group leaders may have an incen-
tive to convince the membership that the symbolic victories they
deliver are important. Proponents conjecture that the open infor-
mation required by tripartism undermines the foundation of
public interest group zealotry because communication of tangible
outcomes that result from the collaborative regulatory process
will undermine the appeal of symbolic politics.' 2 ' Finally, with
the ability to deliver material benefits and the open communica-
tion that proponents see resulting from empowerment, compe-
tition among interest groups will induce the demise of groups
that shun cooperative solutions and thereby forfeit material
benefits for members.
Although these contentions suggest that empowerment may
increase the propensity of public interest groups to cooperate,
any prediction of wholesale changes in the nature of interest
group participation is panglossian. Optimism in empowerment
ignores that many public interest groups are not pure member-
116. See AYRES & BRAITEWAITE, supra note 2, at 75.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 75-78.
119. Of the proponents of collaboration, only Ayres and Braithwaite clearly recog-
nize and attempt to minimize the problem of the "zealous PIG," i.e., the zealous
public interest group. See id. at 75-78. Thus, the arguments in this subpart of the
Article essentially summarize and respond to this attempt.
120. Id. at 76.
121. See, e.g., id.
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ship groups. It also incorrectly assumes that the open provision
of information to interest groups by administrative agencies and
regulated firms will cure information cost problems within groups.
Unfortunately, it is the members' difficulty in obtaining informa-
tion about actions of group leaders in regulatory proceedings and
in educating themselves to understand the significance of those
actions, not lack of information regarding outcomes of regulatory
negotiations, that encourage leaders to take extreme positions.
122
Even with full provision of information by the agency and firm
involved in a regulatory proceeding, few group members will
have sufficient knowledge of the issues, let alone of the regulato-
ry environment, to determine whether the outcome of the pro-
ceeding was the best that the group leaders could deliver.
More fundamentally, empowerment optimists unrealistically
assume homogenous preferences among group members, and
more particularly, that all members will prefer material benefits
over expressive or solidary benefits.' This assumption leads
optimists to predict that competition among groups will force
fringe groups to conform to cooperative strategies."2 Within
groups, these advocates of collaboration would rely on the
contestability of group leadership to ensure that group strategies
do not deviate greatly from the desires of group members, who
are affected directly by the conduct of regulated entities.125 But
122. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 245 (1997) (asserting
that if representatives are to deliberate on behalf of group members, "members
[must] gain access to the contents of the deliberative agency decisionmaking pro-
cess").
123. On the significance of the expressive element of individual decision making,
see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: So-
cial Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUIMI. L. REV.
2121, 2150-54 (1990); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regula-
tory State, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 66-72 (1995).
124. See AYMES & BA WA1TE, supra note 2, at 76.
125. See id. at 83-84. Ayres and Braithwaite state that for their theory to work,
"all that is . . . required is for enough people to absorb the information made avail-
able [by empowerment] and [to] take up the opportunities for participation to supply
countervailing regulatory power and to render that power contestable." Id. at 83.
Accordingly, by contestability, Ayres and Braithwaite seem to mean that any leader
who can garner sufficient ideological and monetary support to create an interest
group would be entitled to participate fully in the regulatory process. This notion of
contestability, however, is essentially the same as what I have characterized as
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members' preferences are not homogenous, however: Some mem-
bers undoubtedly prefer the satisfaction of staking out extreme
positions over material goods. 26 Thus competition, both between
and within groups, is likely to splinter public interest groups,
with some representing more mainstream positions and others
taking radical stances. In this way, competition for group mem-
bers may create an environment hostile to cooperation.127 More-
over, a radical group that adopts an obstructionist strategy can
discourage cooperation by regulated entities with all public in-
terest groups, especially because information that the firm
would provide would go to the obstructionist as well as coopera-
tive groups. Hence, unreasonable action by an extreme group
can work to its advantage by undermining the collaborative
process on which more mainstream groups rely to deliver mate-
rial benefits. In such an environment, competition is more likely
to scuttle cooperative regulation rather than undermine the
viability of obstructionist fringe groups.
Finally, wholehearted defenders of empowerment ignore the
influence of social norms that public interest groups have in-
stilled in group members. To date, many public interest groups
that participate in regulatory matters germinated out of protest
groups that depended for success on the creation of a "knight on
a white charger" identity.2 8 Group leaders, staffs, and even mem-
bers are socialized to oppose positions taken by firms rather than
to cooperate with firms. 29 Even if proponents of empowerment
are correct that cooperation represents an optimal strategy for
interest groups that engage in rational decision making, protest
groups' norms counteract this incentive to cooperate. 30 Thus, the
competition between groups for members and resources, and hence is likely to lead
to the same fragmentation that engenders the emergence of extremist fringe groups.
126. See Salisbury, supra note 90, at 16.
127. See David C. King & Jack L. Walker, Jr., An Ecology of Interest Groups in
America, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS, supra note 65, at 57, 68 ("For some
groups, especially in the citizen sector, policy conflict and continuous competition for
members make for a hostile environment in which opportunities to cooperate with
other groups are severely limited.").
128. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 75.
129. See Gais & Walker, supra note 100, at 103, 107 ("[Oince members are at-
tracted, a staff is recruited, and administrative routines are established, it is not
easy [for the maturing group] to change course.").
130. "A group that begins its life dedicated to campaigns of grass roots agitation
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influences on group members' decisions about whether to sup-
port a group are very different from those of an employee of a
regulated entity, most of whom would tend to comply with regula-
tory commands. In the case of self-enforcement by regulated en-
tities, incentives to cooperate reinforce social norms to comply
with the law in the case of protest group participation in reg-
ulatory matters, group norms usually counteract incentives to
cooperate.131
The government might try directly to counteract fringe group
norms against cooperation, for example, by educating group
members about the value of cooperation or perhaps, more spe-
cifically, about the opportunities group members lose by ob-
structing the regulatory process. 32 Such direct efforts at chang-
ing group norms, however, are difficult and risky,' in large part
because already distrustful protest group members likely will
perceive government efforts to change their attitudes as propa-
ganda, to which they might react by increasing their resistance
to cooperation." u Alternatively, the government might use indi-
rect attempts to induce cooperation, for example, by penalizing
and political mobilization, for example, will find it very difficult to shift its strategy
toward intensive negotiations.., even if circumstances call for such a change in
tactics." Id. at 107-08.
131. Recent studies of the impact of social norms suggest that those who would
try to countermand such norms by law face a difficult task. For example, Bob
Ellickson has found that interactions between ranchers in Shasta County, California
reflect social norms rather than bargaining in the shadow of less efficient legal
rules. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628 (1986). Ellickson's findings
represent an exception to dispute resolution theories positing that legal rules estab-
lish background entitlements that influence the ultimate outcomes of dispute resolu-
tion. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (exploring this theory of the
influence of legal rules on private resolution of divorce disputes).
132. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REV.
943, 974 (1995) (identifying education as a process for inculcating orthodox values in
members of society); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031-32 (1996) (discussing the manipulation of norms
through legal mandates).
133. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, & Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1697, 1732 (1996).
134. See Lessig, supra note 132, at 974-75 (stating that if the process of inculcat-
ing values is "revealed or understood as 'nere' coercion, then its pedagogic effect
ceases").
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groups that engage in obstruction of the regulatory process,
13 5
perhaps by barring such groups from that process."6
Unfortunately, penalizing groups for engaging in anticoopera-
tive behavior is also problematic because of the difficulty of
distinguishing such behavior from legitimate conduct of a group
participating in regulatory collaboration. In a collaborative en-
deavor, an empowered group must be free to refuse to accede to
demands that the group truly deems unacceptable. 3 7 Hence,
penalties for refusals to cooperate would hinge on a determina-
tion that the group engaged in "bad faith" in representing which
regulatory outcomes it would find acceptable, a determination
about the state of mind of the group that may make no sense,
and in any case would be extremely difficult to prove. In sum,
regulators' efforts to overcome protest groups' norms against co-
operation are unlikely to succeed.
A more promising approach would rely on interest groups to
monitor and sanction their uncooperative members. Interest
groups usually have more information and ability about
members' motives than do outsiders like government regulators,
and thus are better able than the government to identify fringe
135. Generally, indirect methods operate by penalizing membership in a group
that refuses to cooperate, or by providing the same good to nonmembers as members
receive from the group, thereby making group membership less valuable. See Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CMI. L. REV. 133, 149 (1996). The government, however,
cannot provide a substitute for the expressive benefit delivered by protest groups
that derives from standing up to the established orthodoxy, which the government
itself represents. Hence, penalizing the group remains the only means for the gov-
ernment to discourage an anticooperative group norm that would threaten a collabo-
rative regulatory process.
136. Denying an obstructionist group access to the regulatory process may be
more effective than imposing monetary penalties for obstruction because lack of ac-
cess, unlike a fine, undermines the appeal of the group as an intermediary by which
members can register a protest. Cf Lessig, supra note 132, at 971-72, 1012 (arguing
that outlawing dueling in the Old South might have been less effective than banning
duelers from holding public office, because the latter would undermine the same
gentleman's sense of duty that prompted dueling in the first place).
137. As one set of proponents of collaborative regulation states: "The parties in
public disputes can, and should, satisfy their own interests. No apologies are neces-
sary for pursuing selfish rather than altruistic goals." LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLV-
ING PUBLIC DISPuTES 238 (1987).
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factions. If an extremist faction is viewed as a defector from a
larger, more orthodox group, then regulators might seek to har-
ness the institutional advantages enjoyed by the group by em-
powering the larger group to discipline the defectors. 8 Such
empowerment might be implemented by creating a mechanism
for an interest group to exclude representatives of individuals
who are similarly situated to the groups' members from partici-
pating in the regulatory process.3 9
IH. EVALUATION OF CURRENT MEANS FOR EMPOWERING
REGULATORY BENEFICIARIES
Although the analysis above portrays a pessimistic view of
empowerment as a means of achieving cooperative regulatory
systems, in limited contexts, empowerment may succeed in re-
ducing the costs of adversarialism and improving the flexibility
of regulation. Many of the problems with empowerment result
from the freedom of every group to use and abuse information
and participatory opportunities that come from empowerment;
the analysis assumed no mechanism to restrict empowerment to
groups likely to cooperate. This suggests that selective empower-
ment might avoid some of the problems radical fringe groups
cause. Granting regulators the authority to select the groups to
be empowered, however, can undermine the role that beneficiary
138. See Posner, supra note 135, at 155-61 (discussing when groups should be
allowed to resolve intragroup disputes and when courts should intervene in such
resolutions).
139. So implemented, collaborative governance might appear, at first blush, to fit
within the aegis of corporatism, broadly defined
as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and
granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respec-
tive categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.
Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in TRENDS TOWARD
CORPORArIST INTERIEDIATION 7, 13 & n.22 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Gerhard
Lehmbruch eds., 1979). Collaborative governance differs, however, from corporatism
in that it envisions a shifting set of organizations, or at least a shifting set of lead-
ers of organizations, that are responsive to the preferences of individuals who are
actually affected by regulatory decisions. See HANDLER, supra note 57, at 244-45.
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groups play in avoiding sweetheart deals between firms and
regulators. It may also defeat attempts to achieve cooperative
outcomes by emboldening excluded groups to sabotage the pro-
cess. To better understand the need for restrictions on empower-
ment, as well as problems that may be created by selective in-
clusion, an examination of experiences with three established
efforts at empowerment-negotiated rulemaking, citizen suits,
and the EPA's Project XL-might prove illuminating.
A. Negotiated Rulemaking as a Mechanism for Empowering
Interest Groups
Negotiated rulemaking is one mechanism for empowerment of
interest groups for which there may be a sufficient history to
permit a meaningful evaluation of its successes and failures.'
This mechanism allows stakeholders in a regulatory matter to
formulate a rule at its earliest stages.'' As soon as the
rulemaking agency determines that there is a need for a rule
and that negotiated rulemaking is appropriate, the agency con-
venes a rulemaking negotiating committee.' Ideally this com-
mittee includes representatives of all interests likely to be af-
fected by the ultimate rule,'4 although in reality the need for a
workable number of discussants limits the group size and forces
exclusion of some groups from the committee.' The committee
140. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1255 (1997) ("Negotiated rulemaking ap-
pears by most accounts to have come of age.").
141. See id. at 1266-67.
142. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (1994) (detailing factors that an agency shall use in
deciding whether "use of the negotiated rulemaking procedure is in the public inter-
est").
143. See DAVID M. PRITZKER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, BUILDING CONSENSUS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTING THE NEGOTI-
ATED RULEMAKING ACT (1995); Harter, supra note 27, at 52-53. The Negotiated
Rulemaking Act requires that an agency using negotiated rulemaking should assure
that "there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can be convened with a bal-
anced representation of persons who can adequately represent the interests [of all
persons who will be significantly affected by the rule]." 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3).
144. See Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Ver-
sus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counter-Claims, and Empirical Evidence 13,
34 (Nov. 20, 1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1997 Northwest Politi-
cal Science Association Annual Meeting, on file with author) (reporting that 34% of
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then attempts to develop a rule that all of the representatives
can support.145 If the committee reaches consensus on a rule, it
reports that to the agency, which then initiates an Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking proceeding by using the
consensus of the committee as the basis for a proposed rule.
146
The agency remains free to modify the rule as part of the notice
and comment rulemaking proceeding. 47
Experimentation with negotiated rulemaking at federal agen-
cies dates back to 1983,148 and in 1990 Congress endorsed nego-
tiated rulemaking as a means of addressing the propensity of
the APA rulemaking process to "cause parties with different
interests to assume conflicting and antagonistic positions and to
engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation over agency
rules."' 49 Since 1983, agencies have convened negotiated rule-
making committees for at least sixty-seven rules and have pro-
mulgated at least thirty-five negotiated rules. 5 °
participants in negotiated rulemaking who responded to a survey believed that some
affected interests were not included on the negotiating committee); see also
Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1324 (citing CORNELIUS KERWIN & LAURA LANGBEIN,
AN EVOLUTION OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: PHASE I, at 11 (1995)).
145. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1267.
146. The agency is obligated to propose a rule based on the negotiated consensus
only to the maximum extent consistent with the legal obligations of the agency.
Even aside from discretion to deviate to ensure meeting legal obligations, an agency
need not propose the precise consensus rule to which negotiating committee members
agree; an agency need only base the proposed rule on the consensus, see 5 U.S.C. §
563(a)(7), which would seem to allow the agency to add or amend provisions in a
manner that does not directly conflict with the negotiated provisions and even to
amend provisions in a manner inconsistent with the negotiation committee consensus
if the agency feels such inconsistency is necessary, see Patricia M. Wald, ADR and
the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE L.J. 1445, 1469-71 (1997) (discussing agency discre-
tion to propose a rule that deviates from that negotiated by the regulatory negotia-
tion (reg-neg) committee, and noting that an agency commitment to propose a rule
in accordance with the negotiated proposal is probably not judicially enforceable).
147. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 87 (noting an agency's authority to deviate
from a consensus rule); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351,
1358 (1997) (noting that the agency's promulgation of a final rule different from the
negotiated proposed rule might prompt a judicial challenge from a group represented
on the negotiating committee); Wald, supra note 146, at 1458.
148. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1274-75.
149. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 2(2), 104 Stat. 4970.
150. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1274-75.
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The success of negotiated rulemaking, once seemingly taken
for granted, is now contested. In part, controversy over its suc-
cess depends on what one views to be the goals of the program.
Most would include in such goals reducing the time it takes
agencies to promulgate rules and increasing the acceptability of
rules to those who might challenge them.'5' At a deeper level,
however, one might ask whether negotiated rulemaking has
demonstrated a capability for alleviating the adversarialism that
plagues the pluralist regulatory interactions of interest
groups.'52 One might also ask whether negotiated rulemaking
has improved the overall quality of regulations, for example, by
developing more flexible rules to achieve the tasks society asks
of them without leading to the types of absurd decisions that
prompt conjecture about the death of common sense.153 Finally,
even if the answers to these questions are affirmative, one can
ask whether negotiated regulation holds the promise for improv-
ing the regulatory system generally rather than in a limited set
of circumstances.
Agency experience with negotiated rulemaking supports
proponents' arguments that face-to-face deliberation allows tra-
ditional adversaries to overcome differences, but only to a limited
extent. Of the first sixty-seven negotiating committees convened,
thirty-five reached sufficient consensus to prompt the agency to
promulgate a rule.' 5 ' Another nineteen were still under consider-
151. See Harter, supra note 27, at 28-29; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations:
The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1165, 1171 (1994); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPP.
L. REv. 863, 906 (1987); Lawrence Susskind & Laura Van Dam, Squaring Off at the
Table, Not in the Courts, TECH. REV., July 1986, at 36, 38.
152. See Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for
the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTrL. L. 1, 18 (1985) (noting reg-neg proponents' asser-
tions that it will "soften the adversarial posture that animates the current comment
process"); Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 144, at 1 (describing whether negotiated
rulemaking decreases "conflict" as a major point of contention between proponents
and opponents of reg-neg).
153. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 26 (claiming that a "problem solving [meth-
odology] will produce better quality . . . [in that] it is more likely to be conducive to
creative, implementable regulatory solutions capable of adaptation and revision than
informal notice and comment [methodology]").
154. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1274-75.
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ation by committees at the end of 1996, at which time it was too
early to tell whether the committee might ever reach consen-
sus.'55 Agencies disbanded committees that failed to reach suffi-
cient agreement in only thirteen of the first sixty-seven instanc-
es.'56 That stakeholders with opposing interests, many of whom
have staked out identities by taking hard-line positions on regu-
latory matters, were able to reach accords in such a significant
percentage of negotiations indicates that negotiation prior to
parties having taken a position on a rule can induce resolution
of significant differences. 57
Unfortunately, data on judicial challenges to negotiated rules
demonstrate that transcendence of adversarialism is extremely
fragile. Challenges to rules promulgated after committee negoti-
ation occur slightly more frequently than challenges to rules
promulgated without negotiation.' Many challenges come from
groups whose interests were represented on the negotiating
committee.'59 Sometimes such groups object because the final
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1274.
157. In at least some instances, the agency proposed a rule even though the com-
mittee did not reach a full consensus. See Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment: An
Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389, 1425-28 (1997) (describing in an appen-
dix all rules in which an agency had used negotiated rulemaking and promulgated a
final rule, including several in which the negotiating committee disbanded or could
not reach agreement). Thus, the data I cite in the text overstate the extent to which
the negotiating process may have led to consensus.
158. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1298-1301, 1335; see also Langbein &
Kerwin, supra note 144, at 26 (finding "no difference between the two types of
rulemaking with respect to non-enforcement litigation"). Philip Harter, an early and
still major proponent of negotiated rulemaking, asserts that no rule promulgated
precisely as negotiated has ever been subject to judicial challenge. See Harter, supra
note 157, at 1404. Just what constitutes a deviation from a negotiated consensus
proposal, however, is not clear. For example, if the agency adopts additional provi-
sions related to, but not specifically addressed by, the negotiated proposal, does that
constitute a deviation from the proposal? In any case, it is clear that agencies have
frequently seen the need to add to or change negotiated proposals, and that the
negotiation process does not immunize the resulting rule from the usual degree of
challenge. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1324-25 (giving examples in which
groups represented in negotiations challenged rules that they claimed deviated from
the negotiated consensus).
159. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 94-1463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (settling
a challenge to a negotiated rule regarding control of chemical equipment emissions
leaks); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA, 846 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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rule addresses matters that fill gaps in the proposed rule report-
ed out of the committee in a manner contrary to these groups'
understanding of the negotiated consensus. 6 ' Other times these
groups object to changes in the rules prompted by concerns of
the agency, or those expressed during the comment period by
groups not represented on the committee, or by political pres-
sure brought to bear during the APA rulemaking process.' 6 ' One
might also envision a group disagreeing with its representative
on the negotiating committee about whether the negotiated
consensus is in the group's interest, or simply changing its mind
about support for this consensus.'62 Thus, negotiated rules seem
to be carefully crafted deals between interest groups who remain
adversaries on regulatory matters and who, subsequent to the
negotiations, continue to use all means available to them to alter
the negotiated rule to their benefit and to the detriment of other
participants. 163
160. For example, the American Water Works Association challenged an EPA rule
on Disinfectant Byproducts, see American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, No. 96-1208
(D.C. Cir. 1996), despite having participated in the negotiation of the rule, and ex-
pressing surprise and disappointment at some significant provisions of a regulation
in which it had participated in negotiating. See Future Uncertain for Negotiation
Process on Microbials, Disinfection Byproducts, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
21, at 1194, 1195 (Sept. 27, 1996); see also Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1290-94
(describing the American Petroleum Institute's administrative challenge to the second
phase of nitrogen oxide restrictions in reformulated gasoline as inconsistent with the
negotiated rulemaking agreement and the Clean Air Act).
161. See, e.g., USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that to reverse an agency for changing a negotiated rule in response
to comments would "extinguish notice and comment rulemaking in all cases in which
it was preceded by negotiated rulemaking" contrary to the provisions of the Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act and the APA).
162. See Harter, supra note 27, at 102 (predicting that someday a participant in
negotiated rulemaking would change his mind and challenge a negotiated rule);
Wald, supra note 146, at 1458; cf Harter, supra note 157, at 1412 (conceding essen-
tially the fragility of consensus by asserting that if an "agency second-guesses the
[negotiating] committee or takes a long time to review the [committee consensus
proposal], the initial support [for that consensus] can wane").
163. This conclusion is consistent with the views of the participants in the negoti-
ating process, who "tend to view reg-negs in terms of potential issues to be traded
or compromised." Freeman, supra note 2, at 69. But cf Langbein & Kerwin, supra
note 144, at 9-10 (reporting that participants on the negotiated rulemaking commit-
tees were more satisfied with the outcome and process of negotiated rulemaking
than were commenters in notice and comment rulemakings). The conclusion also
comports with a detailed EPA study of negotiated rulemaking that concluded it could
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In addition, groups not directly represented on negotiating com-
mittees bring numerous challenges to negotiated rules.' Such
groups may see themselves as shut out of the process during the
development of the rules and therefore become antagonistic
towards the proposed rule reported out of the committee.165 For
almost every rule, however, some potentially affected interest
will be shut out of the negotiations.6 6 Even groups that to an
outsider might appear to share goals will perceive their interests
a little differently from each other. Hence, the sheer number of
groups and their propensity to factionalize helps explain the
greater likelihood of challenge to a negotiated rule than to a
traditionally promulgated rule.
With respect to the quality of the rule finally promulgated,
data on challenges to negotiated rules hint that the mechanism
may provide a check against agency bias towards regulated
entities.6 Public interest groups appear not to challenge negoti-
ated rules as often as regulated entities. 168 For example, environ-
mentalists brought only one of the six challenges to negotiated
rules promulgated by the EPA.'69 The dearth of challenges by
environmental groups may indicate that participation in negoti-
not find evidence to support EPA literature claiming that the reg-neg process helps
build future relationships between stakeholders. See Brian Polkinghorn, The Influ-
ence of Regulatory Negotiations on the US Environmental Protection Agency as an
Institution 27 (1995) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1995 American Polit-
ical Science Association meeting in Chicago, on file with author).
164. See, e.g., Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531 (9th
Cir. 1993) (water districts not represented on negotiated rulemaking committee chal-
lenged visibility regulations for the Grand Canyon); see also Coglianese, supra note
140, at 1305 (describing challenges by three chemical trade industry associations to
EPA regulations governing wood furniture coatings that resulted from a negotiation
committee that did not include these associations).
165. "[W]e might expect representatives of organizations excluded from a negotia-
tion committee to react more acutely to an adverse portion of a rule if they knew
the rule was developed in explicit consultation with other organizations having po-
tentially divergent interests." Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1325-26.
166. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1210 (1994) (claiming that environmental
groups involved in rulemaking negotiating committees cannot always and do not
necessarily speak for the ordinary citizen).
167. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1290-94, 1302-07.
168. See id.
169. For a detailed discussion to the challenges to these six EPA rules, see id.
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ated rulemaking prevents the agency from shortchanging the
concerns of intended beneficiaries of the rule. 7 ' Survey data
from members of EPA rulemaking negotiating committees, how-
ever, show that representatives of environmental groups express
lower levels of satisfaction with the negotiation process than
other representatives, which cautions against drawing such a
conclusion from the data on challenges.'
In an article detailing two fairly recent negotiated rulemak-
ings, Jody Freeman suggests that the negotiated format also
holds great potential for improving the quality of rules by foster-
ing the development of creative and flexible solutions to regula-
tory problems. 172 Intense negotiation with others who do not
share one's perspective conduces questioning of the fundamental
structure of the regulatory problem as posited by the agency
that convened the negotiating committee.17' This can foster path-
breaking solutions. For example, Freeman reports that the
equipment leaks negotiated rulemaking led to a focus on quality
control principles and overall leak prevention rather than on
emissions factors governing predictions of the frequency and
magnitude of leaks, which the EPA had historically relied on to
calculate risks posed by fugitive emissions of toxic air pollutants
at particular plants. 74 The resulting negotiated rule phases in
170. This conclusion is consistent with anecdotal evidence from agency staff mem-
bers that negotiated rulemaking shifts the rulemaking process away from a focus on
ensuring scientific proof that the rule is justified toward incorporation of the values
of affected interest groups. See Polkinghorn, supra note 163, at 29-30, 32. But cf
Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 144, at 16 (reporting that the EPA perceived negoti-
ated rulemaking as shifting influence of the proposed rule, but not the final rule,
from the agency to other participants). One cannot draw a solid inference from this
data, however, without knowing the percentage of challenges to traditional rules
brought by environmental groups and without a larger sample size. Cf. Coglianese,
supra note 56, at 742-43 (reporting that environmental groups are less likely to
challenge any EPA rule than are regulated entities).
171. See Cornelius Kerwin & Laura Langbein, An Evaluation of Negotiated
Rulemaking at the Environmental Protection Agency: Phase I, at 26 (Sept. 1995)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United
States, on file with author); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Emission Impossible: The EPA
Takes on Lawn Tool Makers, WASH. POST, June 21, 1996, at D1 (reporting that an
environmental group expresses dissatisfaction with negotiated rulemaking).
172. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 41-55.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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more stringent standards than the industry was ready to meet
initially, with the understanding that over the permitted time
frame industry would improve pumps and valves and institute
overall quality improvement programs to limit fugitive emissions
of air toxics.'75 Yet even Freeman concludes that the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking are limited because the cooperative ap-
proach of the representatives does not continue past the
rulemaking stage, and the parties return to an adversarial pos-
ture during the implementation phase.176
This adversarial posture at implementation may stem from a
propensity of negotiating committees to leave differences among
participants unresolved. The rule may be agreeable to all pre-
cisely because it postpones difficult choices until the enforcement
stage of the process. The equipment leaks negotiated rule, cited
as a success by Freeman, specified a process by which regulated
entities were to adopt quality control plans without committing
those entities to precise mandated conduct; the details of the
regulation will be in the yet to be developed plans. The propensi-
ty of negotiated rules to leave details unresolved may reflect the
focus of facilitators on obtaining agreement, without concern
that the resulting proposed rule be good. 7 7 Whatever the cause
of this propensity, EPA staff members outside the negotiating
process have noted that the lack of resolution leads negotiated
rules to be more ambiguous than those promulgated by tradi-
tional means, which in turn makes enforcement of the rules
more difficult.
178
Recognizing that cooperation appears to end when the negoti-
ating committee disbands, Freeman suggests that the traditional
regulatory paradigm, which centers on agency responsibility for
175. See id.
176. See id. at 72.
177. See Polkinghorn, supra note 163, at 25.
178. As one EPA regulator stated about a negotiated rule:
Some of the issues were not resolved as clearly as they should have
been because you negotiated it where the agency doesn't have the
final pen necessarily which makes parts of it more difficult to en-
force. Ok because [the rulemaking committee] couldn't get agreement
on certain things so it was left more ambiguous so it was difficult
for us to enforce it.
Id. at 31 (quoting a response given in an interview with an EPA "administrator").
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formulation and enforcement of rules, should be abandoned in
favor of one that relies on permanent committees of stakeholders
to implement rules.1 9 She suggests that negotiated rulemaking
committees not disband upon promulgation of the rule, but rath-
er that they continue to enforce -and modify rules as experience
with the rules warrants i 0 Virtually all others involved in nego-
tiated rulemaking, however, do not see a continued role for the
committee in the implementation stage, and my prior analysis of
interest groups helps explain why. National public interest
groups have sometimes played the role of representing the inter-
ests of rule beneficiaries in negotiated rulemakings. These
groups may get some benefit and prestige from negotiating a
favorable rule, especially if that rule garners national attention.
The day-to-day implementation of rules, which tends not to
involve salient issues that can bolster interest group member-
ship or support, promises few institutional benefits to such
groups. 18 1  Moreover, interest group theory predicts that local
neighborhood groups, whose members may have the most to
gain from continued involvement in implementation, will have
difficulty affording the significant costs of participating in
rulemaking committee negotiations and overcoming the econom-
ic disincentives to organize because leadership of such groups
promises little benefit for the entrepreneurs needed to build and
sustain such organizations.'
8 2
179. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 72.
180. See id. at 72-73.
181. See Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The
Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 337-38 (explaining why public interest
groups would prefer high-visibility litigation to quiet negotiations); cf Freeman, su-
pra note 2, at 76 (noting that national interest groups sometimes fight turf battles
with local groups by pressuring EPA headquarters in Washington, rather than par-
ticipating in particular negotiated regulations).
182. See OLSON, supra note 108, at 33-36 (concluding that interest groups with
many slightly affected members have greater barriers to organizations than those
with a smaller number of more greatly affected members); Kerwin & Langbein, su-
pra note 171, at 47 (concluding that "participation in negotiated rulemaking emerges
as quite costly, with the impact appearing to fall disproportionately on smaller orga-
nizations"); cf IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 115 (1977) (noting that black
community activists who had pushed for a school desegregation plan in San Francis-
co "were much too busy elsewhere playing a leading role in the struggle for racial
equality" to participate in the actual development of the plan).
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Bill Funk reached a more pessimistic conclusion about the
potential quality of negotiated rules following a comprehensive
analysis of an earlier negotiated rule setting woodstove emis-
sions standards for particulate matter.1"3 Funk's evaluation of
this facially successful negotiated rulemaking raised serious
questions about the extent to which even negotiations that re-
sult in consensus lead to rules that serve the public interest.l1
According to Funk's analysis, the rule reflected the interests of
national environmental groups, the woodstove industry, the
EPA, and state environmental regulators.'85 Environmental
groups, such as the Sierra Club, desired that the EPA regulate
polycyclic organic matter (POM), a potential carcinogen emitted
by woodstoves, as a hazardous air pollutant. 8 ' The EPA had
found that POM did not pose a sufficient threat to the environ-
ment to justify such regulation, but was defending a challenge to
that decision from environmental groups and New York State.'
Some states desired a limitation on woodstove emissions of
particulates so they could allow greater industrial development
without threat of exceeding ambient air quality standards for
particulates. 8 Having the EPA adopt such a limit would save
them the resources and perhaps more importantly the political
cost from imposing their own standards. The woodstove manu-
facturers did not want regulation, but preferred a uniform fed-
eral regulation to the potentially conflicting regulations states
might otherwise impose."8 9 The negotiated rule accommodated
all these interests by imposing new source performance stan-
dards on woodstoves that prohibited the sale of stoves emitting
more than a determined amount of particulate matter.9 ' Such a
rule probably would not have been proposed by any other
mechanism because woodstoves fell well outside the meaning of
183. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation
and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 97 (1987).
184. See d.
185. See id. at 61.
186. See id. at 59.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 58.
189. See id. at 61-62.
190. See id. at 62-65.
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"major source" to which the new source performance standards
could apply. The compromise, however, allowed the EPA to es-
cape suit on this issue, and thus to regulate despite its question-
able legal authority for the rule finally promulgated.'
At first blush, the woodstove rule might appear to be an opti-
mal compromise. The EPA avoided the onerous requirements of
regulating smoke from woodstoves as a hazardous air pollutant
and gave the major affected interests something that each want-
ed. One must wonder, however, whether allowing the EPA to
adopt this rule truly served society's overall interests. Particu-
late emissions from woodstoves was not a national problem; it
affected the ability of certain states to allow industrial develop-
ment.'92 The EPA standard applies nationally, however, requir-
ing woodstove users in areas not plagued by problems with
particulates to pay for catalytic converters and cleaner burning
stoves unnecessarily.'93 The regulations may have reduced expo-
sures to POM, but only coincidentally and without any guaran-
tee that the reduction in exposure actually reduced health risks.
Moreover, the rule seems to undermine the fundamental tenet of
legislative supremacy. The statutory provisions governing new
source performance standards envisioned regulation of industrial
and commercial point sources of pollution, not diffusion into the
atmosphere of pollutants from home appliances. None of the
participants in the rulemaking took into account the precedential
impact of allowing the EPA to expand its regulatory jurisdiction
to such appliances.'
Whatever conclusions one draws about the promise of negoti-
ated rulemaking to improve rulemaking quality, negotiated
rulemaking most likely is unsuitable as a replacement for the
paradigm of notice and comment procedures.'95 Negotiated rule-
191. Some might herald that the committee circumvented statutory limits as an
example of how reforms can ease inflexibility imposed by the "rule of law." See
Seidenfeld, supra note 38, at 36. Others, however, might question whether undermin-
ing clear statutory mandates undermines the ability to check regulators to ensure
they do not act out of expedience or self-interest. See Keith Werhan, Delegalizing
Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 460-61.
192. See Funk, supra note 183, at 58.
193. See id. at 62-65.
194. See id. at 74 (criticizing the rule for allowing the EPA to ignore limits on its
statutory authority).
195. An EPA Negotiated Rulemaking Director has expressed the opinion that 5%
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making does not appear to reduce dramatically the time for
promulgating rules or the likelihood of judicial challenge.196
More significantly, all commentators agree that negotiated rule-
making is an intensive process requiring a concentrated devotion
of resources by the agency and private negotiation partici-
pants.19 Moreover, the very process of negotiating rules depends
on a background of existing regulatory entitlements, which flow
from standards the agency establishes by traditional regulatory
processes, and the willingness of the parties to negotiate serious-
ly, which depends in turn on threats by the agency of more dras-
tic traditionally set standards.'98 From a theoretical perspective,
the very legitimacy of negotiated rulemaking depends on its
incorporation in the more traditional rulemaking process. Were
a negotiating committee able to bind the agency to promulgate
and implement the rule that the committee developed, negotiat-
ed rulemaking would raise the specter of privately enacted
law.'99 Thus, negotiated rulemaking seems an unlikely candidate
to 10% of its rules are amenable to development by negotiation. See William H.
Miller, Bypassing the Lawyers: "Regulatory Negotiation" Gets Test in Agencies, INDUS-
TRY WK., June 23, 1986, at 20, 21; see also Polkinghorn, supra note 163, at 11-12
(reporting that several commentators estimated that 10% of rules are amenable to
negotiation, but noting that historically the EPA has actually negotiated less than
1% of its rules since it first began using the process).
196. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1309 (noting that legal challenges have
actually increased at the EPA since implementing neg-reg procedures). But cf
Harter, supra note 157, at 1421-22 (questioning the use of the total number of days
to promulgate a rule as a measure of the impact of negotiated rulemaking on the
time it takes to adopt a rule).
197. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRrTE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 190 (1994); Harter, supra note 157, at 1420; Ellen
Siegler, Regulatory. Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,647, 10,651 (Oct. 1992). But cf Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon,
The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 151
(1985) (reporting that although participants "were surprised at the amount of time
and effort it took to negotiate a consensus rule, they agreed that the time invested
up-front reduced the overall amount of time involved in litigation and subsequent
administrative wrangling").
198. Audio Tape of the Response of Thomas E. Kelly, Director, Office of Manage-
ment and Information, United States Environmental Protection Agency, During the
Administrative Law Section Program at the 1998 Meeting of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools, to a Question About the Extent to Which the Negotiated Regu-
lation Process Depended on Existing Regulations and the Existence of the Agency's
Traditional Rulemaking Authority (Jan. 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kelly
Audio tape].
199. The one aspect of the nondelegation doctrine that the Supreme Court has
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to replace notice and comment rulemaking as the predominant
regulatory paradigm, and hence cannot be the panacea for in-
flexible rules and an ossified rulemaking process that some
would wish to make it.200
This is not to disavow the influence of negotiated regulation
entirely, but that influence most likely will occur within the
paradigm of traditional notice and comment rulemaking. Past
negotiated rulemaking has demonstrated that the agency can
benefit from brainstorming problem-solving sessions with a wide
array of affected interest groups prior to issuing a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking. Agencies appear receptive to incorporating
such informal processes into the stage during which the agencies
consider the need for rules and develop their basic architec-
ture.2"' The collaborative process is most promising, however, if
used as a tool to guide agency discretion, rather than as an
alternative mechanism to promulgate regulations backed by the
coercive power of the state.
never disavowed is that Congress cannot delegate lawmaking functions to purely
private bodies. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936); see also
Funk, supra note 147, at 1373 (stating that "there was an early concern that negoti-
ated' rulemaking could run afoul of the non-delegation doctrine-not the unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative authority to an agency, but the potentially unlaw-
ful . . . delegation of legislative authority to private entities"). There is some aca-
demic disagreement about the extent of an agency's discretion to deviate or reject
negotiated rules necessary to avoid the process being deemed unconstitutional private
law making, see Freeman, supra note 2, at 83-89, but the agency or courts must
retain some power to ensure that negotiated rules do not contravene statutory provi-
sions and aim to implement something other than deals struck by some, but not all,
affected interest groups, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2000) (criticizing the nondelegation doctrine as
a limitation on private authority to regulate) (manuscript at 32-33, on file with au-
thor).
200. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 72-73 (advocating the problem-solving ap-
proach of reg-neg as an alternative to traditional agency-centered regulation and
arguing for an extension of the negotiating committees' authority into the regulatory
implementation stage).
201. See Kelly Audio tape, supra note 198. Even Cary Coglianese, perhaps the
most vociferous skeptic of negotiated rulemaking, admits the benefits of such dis-
cussions if divorced from a process aimed at reaching consensus of interest groups
that in turn constrains agency discretion. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1332-
458
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B. Citizen Suits as a Mechanism for Empowering Interest
Groups
Citizen suits provide another mechanism for empowering
regulatory beneficiaries for which there is sufficient history to
evaluate the impact of such empowerment. Many statutes, espe-
cially those under which the EPA regulates pollution, directly
authorize citizens to enforce statutory and regulatory require-
ments against violators. °2 At first blush, citizen suits would not
seem to be promising candidates for collaborative regulation
because they are premised on litigation, which is inherently ad-
versarial. Nonetheless, citizen suit provisions, such as those
under the Clean Water Act (CWA)203 on which I focus, do em-
power interest groups in a manner that closely tracks theoreti-
cally recommended mechanisms, °4 and hold the potential for
inducing collaborative negotiation of problems by industry and
groups that bring such actions.2 0 5 The CWA authorizes members
of the public to sue for fines as well as to mandate compliance,0 6
and the EPA maintains a list of violations of CWA permits and
regulations that it has detected.0 7 Thus, public interest groups
can use information that the agency has collected to provide re-
dundant enforcement of regulatory requirements.2 8 The CWA
202. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1994).
203. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(1994).
204. These mechanisms-the ability of regulatory beneficiaries to be privy to the
same information regarding violations as is the agency and to sue for the same
penalties as can the agency--correspond to attributes of empowerment that Ayres
and Braithwaite suggest are necessary for workable tripartism. See AYURS &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 57-58.
205. See generally Coglianese, supra note 56 (discussing litigation as a means of
fostering negotiation between agencies and regulated entities).
206. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
207. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1) (1998) (requiring permittees under the CWA to re-
port violations of permit conditions or regulatory standards).
208. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environ-
mental Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLrIcs:
PUBLIC COsTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 105, 109 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr.
eds., 1992) (asserting that the EPA listing of violations has prompted a sharp in-
crease in citizen suits under the CWA); see also JEFFREY G. MILLER, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW INSTrUTE, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION
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deviates from the theoretical model of empowering enforcement
only in precluding such enforcement if the EPA or an authorized
state environmental agency is already diligently prosecuting the
violation, and by requiring a private citizen to provide sixty days
notice to the EPA and the state before bringing an enforcement
action.2"9 Pragmatically these provisions do little to limit the
power of interest groups because the EPA does not have the
resources to prosecute every violation for which it believes its in-
volvement is important and because sixty days may be an insuf-
ficient time for the EPA or a state to demonstrate diligent en-
forcement.210
The CWA prohibits any point source from discharging any
pollutant into navigable waters except in compliance with efflu-
ent standards or permits issued by the EPA or state approved
permit programs."' Such permits must ensure that sources
comply with both technologically based and water quality based
standards.212 For municipal wastewater treatment plants, which
are publicly owned, permits aim primarily at meeting water
quality standards established to ensure against threats to health
and the environment;213 for industrial point sources, which are
CONTROL LAWS 132 (1987) (noting the usefulness of permittees' "Discharge Monitor-
ing Reports" for citizen group discovery of violations actionable under the CWA citi-
zen suit provisions).
209. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
210. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 53, at 897-98. Under the CWA, an EPA
enforcement action in federal court, brought after notice by a citizens group of intent
to sue, bars the citizen suit. An EPA administrative enforcement action, however,
does not bar the citizen suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B); see also MICHAEL D.
AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS § 6.06 (1995) (discussing the issues raised
for citizen suits by agency prosecution of a violation).
211. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (authorizing the EPA to set effluent limits and
administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit program);
David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1569 (1995).
212. See Hodas, supra note 211, at 1569.
213. Publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) have been excused from meeting
technology forcing effluent limits and have enjoyed long delays for compliance with
effluent limits based on currently available technologies. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1)
(allowing a POTW, until July 1, 1988, to delay meeting "best practicable" technology
standards until it received aid from the federal government allowing it to pay for
construction to meet that standard); see also 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER § 4.31, at 449 (1986) ("The phase two 'best practicable'
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usually privately owned, permits predominantly reflect the Act's
technologically based standards, which are not justified by the
need to maintain safe and environmentally sound levels of water
quality.
214
Congress has not given the EPA sufficient resources to fully
enforce permit violations under the CWA.215 State enforcement
agencies are also not heavily funded, and private suits to enjoin
and penalize such violations rival government actions as a
means of enforcing the CWA.216 If the goal of the citizen suit pro-
vision was to provide citizens a means of ensuring that they de-
rive the benefits promised by the CWA, at first blush the num-
ber of such suits indicates that the provision is working. A closer
analysis, however, raises at least some doubt about whether
citizen suits primarily deliver money to the coffers of environ-
mental interest groups, and only secondarily deliver improve-
ments in water quality.
A substantial number of citizen suits under the CWA have
been brought by a handful of national or large regional environ-
mental groups like the Atlantic States Legal Foundation.217
These groups usually seek a fine to be paid into the United
standard for POTWs still survives, not as an effluent standard but as a measure of
how the plants are to be built under the funding provisions of the Act.") (citing 33
U.S.CA. § 1281(g)(2)(A)). Hence, POTWs permits usually impose limits based on
health and safety evaluations rather than on harsher limits based only on techno-
logical feasibility.
214. Industrial sources were subject to a 1977 deadline for meeting standards
based on a "best practicable" technology criterion, and were subject to a 1989 dead-
line for meeting tougher standards, based, depending on the pollutant, on either a
"best practicable control technology" criterion or a "best available technology economi-
cally achievable" criterion. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i); see id. §
1311(b)(2)(E), (b)(2)(F). The "best achievable technology" standard requires the use of
experimental technologies not in routine use or not in use at all. See 2 RODGERS,
supra note 213, § 4.29(A)(2).
215. See Hodas, supra note 211, at 1558-60. But cf Greve, supra note 208, at
114-17 (arguing that Congress never meant for penalties to attach to every violation
of a permit or regulation and that citizen suits currently supplement EPA enforce-
ment in a manner that Congress did not intend).
216. From 1983 to 1993, the number of 60-day notices for citizen suits seeking
penalties for violations of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) water permits greatly exceeded the number of federal penalty enforcement
actions and almost equaled the number of state judicial enforcement actions. See
Hodas, supra note 211, at 1573.
217. See Greve, supra note 208, at 108.
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States Treasury as well as an order that the defendant comply
with its permit requirements.218 In most cases, however, the
parties settle these penalty-seeking suits, with plaintiffs obtain-
ing guarantees of permit compliance along with significant at-
torney fees and sometimes monetary grants to the plaintiff or a
sister organization. 219 By one account, a group chooses whom to
sue based on the likelihood of achieving significant environmen-
tal benefits without an inordinate cost to the group.22 ° Plaintiffs
rely on EPA lists of permit violations to identify large volume
industrial polluters who repeatedly violate their permit require-
ments. Such lists provide a low cost means of identifying suits
that promise significant direct environmental benefits and deter-
rent effects.
By an alternative account, however, the ability to obtain a
large penalty at little cost to the plaintiff guarantees only that
the suit is likely to benefit the plaintiff as an interest group
without regard to the suit's effect on the environment.2 2 1 Public
interest plaintiffs rarely have sued publicly owned wastewater
treatment facilities even though these facilities account for more
pollution than industrial sources, and despite that provisions in
treatment facility permits are more closely tied to water quality
than those of industrial plant permits.222 One reason for the
focus on private industrial sources is that plaintiffs would likely
have greater difficulty settling with public entities for monetary
awards and grants than they do with private defendants. 2' The
proposition that plaintiffs who bring penalty actions focus on
monetary awards rather than environmental benefits is rein-
forced by several suits involving record-keeping violations, the
correction of which provided no direct benefit to environmental
quality.2
24
218. See id. at 109.
219. See id. at 109-10.
220. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 53, at 928 (reporting that citizen suit
plaintiffs sue for large penalties because they see such penalties as a means of de-
terring an entity's calculated decision to violate environmental regulations).
221. See Greve, supra note 208, at 112.
222. See id. at 111.
223. See id.
224. See id.; see also, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237,
1241 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant's failure to file reports under the
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One might therefore interpret data about citizen suits under
the CWA as evidence that a significant number of environmental
interest group plaintiffs act to benefit leaders and patrons of the
group, who depend on continued funding, rather than to deliver
the material benefit of cleaner water to group members. This
interpretation, however, may be too pessimistic. Although the
data clearly demonstrate that interest groups focus on the abil-
ity of suits to fill their coffers, in the long run, this strategy
might provide greater benefits to the environment than merely
maximizing environmental benefits in each case. Monetary pay-
ments from citizen suits help groups like the National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) to maintain an enforcement program
and hence to continue to bring citizen suits that may provide
greater overall pollution reductions than would a single suit fo-
cused on such reductions. In short, the strategy of assuring
funding for the group may be consistent with reasonable at-
tempts to deliver material benefits to group members.
A normative evaluation of the impact of empowerment via
citizen suits on the propensity of interest groups to cooperate in
a collaborative regulatory venture depends heavily on the goals
attributed to enforcement policy. If one views permit standards
as reflecting determinations of optimal levels of pollution, one
would view any mechanism that improves compliance with such
standards as socially beneficial. Enforcement becomes a mecha-
nism for coercing preset optimal behavior. 25 From this perspec-
Citizens Right to Know Act subjected the defendant to a total fine that could exceed
$100 million, even though the defendant appeared not to have known that it had to
file the reports and cured the violation promptly after receiving notice of suit and
prior to the commencement of the suit), rev'd, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that the
plaintiff did not have standing because a court cannot redress record-keeping viola-
tions that the defendant has already cured); Public Interest Research Group of N.J.,
Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 40 ERC 1917, 1927-28 (D.N.J. 1995) (awarding a
penalty in excess of $2 million despite finding that the NPDES permit violation did
not adversely affect water quality), rev'd, 123 F.3d 111, 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the district court's finding of no harm or threat of harm implied that
plaintiffs did not allege injury in fact, and, therefore, did not have standing).
225. For a description of the distinction between regulation that coerces a preset
notion of optimal behavior and regulation that facilitates cooperation to arrive at
optimal outcomes, see John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, Can Government Facilitate
Cooperation? An Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 693,
695-98 (1997).
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tive, citizen suits have been beneficial. The EPA and, to a great-
er extent, state enforcement efforts often have imposed only
minimal penalties and have allowed long lead times for violators
to comply with permit requirements.226 States in particular are
likely to be sensitive to threats of relocation and plant shut-
downs in considering enforcement actions. 2 7 Suits by groups like
the Atlantic States Legal Foundation have exacted more signifi-
cant penalties from violators than have state and federal en-
forcement actions.228 As a result, they should have a greater
deterrent effect on violations than government enforcement
actions.229 Anecdotal evidence indicates that, in some cases,
private suits have been able to force compliance even when
drawn out EPA enforcement activity has not.2"' Hence, from the
coercing compliance perspective, citizen suits seem to serve as a
valuable backstop against sweetheart deals between government
enforcement authorities and polluting entities.
From another perspective, citizen suits fare poorly as a means
of facilitating collaboration to achieve desired discharge levels by
an individual plant. This less charitable assessment of citizen
suits follows if one views a source's exceeding of permit levels as
a signal of the need for more focused government attention on
226. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 53, at 928-29; Hodas, supra note 211, at
1621. A recent comparison of noncompliance with NPDES requirements in the states
of Georgia and Washington indicated that facilities found to have violated a permit
or regulatory requirement remained out of compliance for an average of 5.5 months
in Georgia and 3.6 months in Washington. See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs
Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 26 (1997).
227. See Flatt, supra note 226, at 2-3 (noting that a state's need for economic
development will affect its propensity to enforce environmental laws); Robert R.
Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2382-83 (1996) (describing states' abilities to take into account
local social and economic needs as a reason for state enforcement of environmental
law); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1215, 1238 (1992) (describing models illustrating the process by which states
incorporate competition for jobs and capital into the setting of their environmental
standards).
228. See Hodas, supra note 211, at 1652 & n.558.
229. But cf Greve, supra note 208, at 119 (contending that citizen suits deter
industry cooperation and voluntary compliance).
230. See Hodas, supra note 211, at 1620 & n.380.
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appropriate pollution levels from that source. From this perspec-
tive, enforcement is merely part of a regulatory mechanism that
relies on continued negotiation to reach consensus about appro-
priate pollution levels. This view is borne out, at least in part,
by data indicating that the EPA has obtained agreements from
regulatory violators to implement valuable supplemental envi-
ronmental projects, which the EPA could not unilaterally order
entities to undertake.2"' Citizen suits interfere with the EPA's
ability to reach settlements that may require such projects by
chilling the willingness of regulated entities to share information
out of the fear of being sued by private environmental groups. 2
Citizen suits also force the EPA to file court suits of its own to
preserve its initiative to reach settlements with violators, and
such EPA suits displace more informal bases for settlement.'
Moreover, from a perspective that views enforcement as a
means of encouraging case-by-case optimization of the CWA's
mandate, enforcement should take into account circumstances
surrounding particular violations, such as the effect of compli-
231. See Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of
Developing and Implementing Environmental Policy 28-29 (1998) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
232. For example, a 1995 study of industry sectors with more than 100 employees
and with annual sales exceeding $100 million revealed that, of the companies that
did conduct environmental audits (nearly 75% of those polled), 45% were hesitant to
expand their auditing program because they feared their self-policing would be used
against them in citizen suits and enforcement actions. See PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP,
THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT SURVEY OF U.S. BUSINESS 28 (1995); see
also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Carey Ann Mathews, Environmental Democracy, 22
J. CORP. L. 395, 398 (1997) ("Government and business are also aware, however,
that increased self-policing increases vulnerability to lawsuits."); State Attorneys Quiz
Browner on Audits, Federal Facilities, Criminal Investigations, Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA), at 2179 (Mar. 25, 1994), available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, CHEMRG
File [hereinafter State Attorneys Quiz Browner] (quoting Lee Fisher, Ohio attorney
general, who stated that "blusinesses are afraid of doing environmental audits for
fear they will be hurt by audits by uncovering damaging information that... will
[be] use[d] against them").
233. Almost all environmental citizen suits are precluded if the EPA or the state
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in either federal or state
court. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994) (providing for citizen suits under the
Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (1994) (providing for citizen suits under the
Solid Waste Disposal Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994) (providing for citizen
suits under the Clean Air Act). For a description of how citizen suits interfere with
the EPA's enforcement agenda, see Rossi, supra note 122, at 223-24.
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ance on the local economy, which stands to lose significantly if
enforcement induces the closing of a plant. In fact, one can ar-
gue that much of the impact of water pollution is sufficiently
local that citizens in the locale of the polluter have an incentive
to balance the benefits of strict compliance against its bur-
dens.2 ' By this account, citizen suits that are brought by
nonlocal environmental organizations actually undermine the
empowerment of local residents, who feel both the pinch of pol-
lution and the impact of cutbacks in plant operation that CWA
enforcement might prompt. The same argument counsels that
state governments, being somewhat accountable to local political
pressure, are in a better position than both the EPA and nation-
al interest groups to decide the appropriate level of enforcement
activity. Thus, that states have reacted more aggressively in
trying to preclude citizen suits indicates that such suits may
seek enforcement that is counterproductive.
Finally, industry reaction to citizen suits bodes poorly for the
argument that permitting such suits fosters cooperative regula-
tion. Because of the threat of citizen suits, polluters have less
incentive to accept permit limitations that may commit them to
aggressive pollution reduction. In addition, citizen suits discour-
age industry self-monitoring of permit violations. Overall, al-
though citizen suits appear to fit the criteria of empowerment
specified by collaborative governance theorists, their availability
has not seemed to have engendered meaningful collaborative
processes for determining appropriate pollution discharge levels
under the CWA.
C. Project XL as an Example of Collaborative Regulation
A third, much touted, example of collaborative regulation,
which illustrates how self-design might operate successfully and
yet highlights some of its limits, is the EPA's Project XL.23s The
234. See generally Revesz, supra note 227, at 94 (advocating that "race to the
bottom" arguments for federal environmental laws are unjustified given the likeli-
hood that, in setting environmental standards, states will balance the social benefits
of development against environmental harms to reach an optimal outcome).
235. The Clinton administration announced Project XL in the Spring of 1995 as
part of the President's National Performance Review. See BILL CLINTON & AL GORE,
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 36
466 [Vol. 41:411
20001 EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS 467
EPA intends Project XL to allow regulated sources the flexibility
to develop alternatives to existing regulatory requirements in
order to produce greater environmental benefits at lower cost.
236
The EPA envisions selecting fifty projects from proposals sub-
mitted by regulated sources,237 and listed the following eight
criteria for project approval: achievement of "environmental
performance that is superior to what would be achieved through
compliance with current and reasonably anticipated future reg-
ulation"; "cost savings and paperwork reduction"; "support of
parties that have a stake in the environmental impacts of the
project"; testing of innovative strategies; testing of new ap-
proaches that could transfer generally to agency programs; mea-
surable objectives and requirements that stakeholders can use to
evaluate performance; and protection of worker safety and as-
surance of no environmental injustice.2 8 Thus far, the EPA has
approved thirteen XL plans, eleven of which private companies
sponsorY.9
(1995). Although the EPA has not touted Project XL as a substitute for traditionally
promulgated regulation, others have. See Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-ent
Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton
Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 140 (claiming that Project XL
is the "Clinton administration's answer" to replacing inefficient command-and-control
regulation); see also Freeman, supra note 2, at 56 (noting Project XL's potential for
providing a "problem solving" approach to regulation).
236. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (1995).
In exchange for regulatory flexibility, the Project XL program requires participants
to reduce pollution below levels otherwise allowed by regulation. See id. at 27,283.
The Project XL program encompasses initiatives for manufacturing company site-
specific projects, industry-wide projects, federal agency projects, and community-based
projects. See id. at 27,288. In this Article, I focus on the program for site-specific
manufacturing company projects, which is the best developed part of the program
and the part most analogous to proposals for collaborative regulation.
237. See id. at 27,289.
238. Id. at 27,287. More recently, the EPA has clarified that it would emphasize
three of the eight criteria: "superior environmental performance, regulatory flexibility
and stakeholder involvement." Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed.
Reg. 19,872 (1997).
239. The following entities sponsor these projects: HADCO Corp., covering four
facilities in Oswego, New York, and Derry, Hudson, and Salem, New Hampshire;
Jack M. Berry, Inc., covering its facility near LaBelle, Florida; Intel covering its
facility in Chandler, Arizona; Merck & Co., covering its facility in Elkton, Virginia;
Witco Corporation, covering its facility in Sisterville, West Virginia; Weyerhaeuser
Co., covering its facility in Oglethorpe, Georgia; Molex, covering its facility in Lin-
coln, Nebraska; Lucent Technologies, potentially operating on a company-wide basis,
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1. The Project XL Process
The regulated company that sponsors the project begins the
Project XL process by submitting a proposal to the EPA staff.2
The EPA staff reviews the proposal to ensure it comes "within
the scope of Project XL," and, if it does, the agency forms a team
to review and further develop the proposal.2' 1 The EPA notifies
state officials about the proposal, seeks additional information
from the applicant, and informs the applicant of any problems
that the staff identifies with the proposal. 2 The review team
and the applicant then negotiate a final proposal.' 4 As part of
the proposal, the applicant identifies stakeholders it believes
should be involved in the negotiation of the final plan.2" Al-
though the EPA can reject a proposal altogether if it finds the
list of stakeholders inadequate, the project sponsor remains
responsible for involving stakeholders throughout the process.245
The final project agreement (FPA) is supposed to reflect a con-
sensus of the stakeholders and indicate specific rules, permits,
and variances necessary to render the agreement legally enforce-
able.24
The mechanism for monitoring compliance with a Project XL
plan is specified in the final agreement.4 The collection and
publication of data relevant to performance under plans vary
widely from plan to plan. Some plans, like those of Berry, Merck,
but initially covering facilities in Allentown and Reading, Pennsylvania, and Orlando,
Florida; Jacoby Development Corporation, covering its facility in Atlanta, Georgia;
Exxon's Fairmont Coke Works Superfund Site in Fairmont, West Virginia; Andersen
Corp., covering its facility in Bayport, Minnesota; the Department of Defense, cover-
ing the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; and the Massachusetts Department
of Environmental Protection. See generally The XL Projects (visited Nov. 21, 1999)
<http'//yosemite.epa.govxlxlhome.nsf/all/xlinfo> [hereinafterXL Implementation Web-
site].
240. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,878.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id. According to one plan proponent, however, "[The] [clonsensus process
[is] not fully agreed to or understood." Intel Project XL Lessons Learned Summary
(visited Nov. 21, 1999) <http'//www.intel.comlmtellother/ehs/projecbdllsnlrnl.htm>.
247. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,875.
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and OSI Specialties, rely heavily on self-reporting of compli-
ance.2' These companies simply prepare compliance reports that
they send to the EPA and stakeholders, and that they make
available to the public for inspection.249 These plans neither
provide for additional meetings of stakeholders to evaluate the
company's performance nor address controversies involving the
meeting of the plans' requirements. Other plans, like those of
Intel, Weyerhaeuser, and HADCO, specify more than mere re-
porting of performance and provide for additional meetings of
stakeholders to evaluate the companies' performance.5 Perhaps
not coincidentally, the commitment to stakeholder involvement
in the monitoring and enforcement of a plan appears to vary
inversely with the inclusion of groups, such as hard-line national
environmental groups, which may threaten the process of settle-
ment and accommodation that characterizes the EPA's approach
to enforcement.2 51
248. See Berry Corporation Final Project Agreement (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http'//yosemite.epa.gov/xhome.nsf/all/berzy-fpa.html> [hereinafter Berry Corp.
Website]; Merck & Co., Inc., Stonewall Plant, Project XL, Final Project Agreement
(visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http'/yosemite.epa.gov/xIxl home.nsf/all/final-merckfpa.html>
[hereinafter Merck & Co. Website]; Project XL Final Project Agreement for the OS;
Specialties Plant in Sistersville, West Virginia (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<httpt/yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/alYfinalfpal1O7.html>.
249. Berry and Witco Corp. have agreed to make required reports available for
public inspection. See Berry Corp. Website, supra note 248; Witco Reduces Unregulat-
ed Emissions in One of Its Production Processes Rather than Installing Less-Effective,
Otherwise-Required Emission Controls for Its Wastewater Treatment Facility (visited
Nov. 23, 1999) <http/yosemite.epa.gov/xlxLhome.nsfall/osi.html>. Merck will send
copies of reports to signatories of the FPA. See Merck & Co. Website, supra note
248. The Department of Defense will send reports to interested parties upon request.
See XL Implementation Website, supra note 239.
250. Weyerhaeuser has agreed to provide the minutes of periodic performance re-
view conferences. See Weyerhaeuser FPA (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http//yosemite.epa.
gov/xl/x-home.nsf/all/weyfinal fpa.html> [hereinafter Weyerhaeuser Website]. Intel's
FPA requires that it include reasons in its mandatory reports for any inability to
meet one or more of its commitments under the FPA. See Project XL: Final Project
Agreement: 2 (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http'//yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/alYintel
fpa.final2.html> [hereinafter Final Project Agreement Website]. Also, Intel's air permit
calls for semiannual public meetings to address progress toward achieving the FPA.
See Timothy J. Mohin, The Alternative Compliance Model: A Bridge to the Future of
Environmental Management, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,345, 10,349
(1997). HADCO has agreed to hold annual on-site meetings with its stakeholders
requesting such a meeting after receiving a copy of the annual report. See Final
Project Agreement Work Plan (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <httpl/yosemite.epa.gov/x/xl_
.home.nsf/all/hadcofinal-fpa.html>.
251. Berry's and Merck's -projects involve regional and national groups as well as
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The FPA sets goals for the project facility. These goals may
reflect tradeoffs between demanding greater than required per-
formance by a facility with respect to one medium of pollution,252
while excusing a facility from meeting regulatory limits with re-
spect to another medium of pollution." FPA goals are not en-
forceable standards, but may include both legally enforceable
and voluntary commitments by the facility to meet specified
standards." Project XL envisions that an FPA will provide a
mechanism for holding the facility accountable if it fails to meet
voluntary commitments.255 For example, an FPA may specify the
convening of stakeholders to determine why the facility has
failed to meet voluntary commitments and how this failure
should be addressed. Although a facility that fails to meet volun-
tary commitments does not face any legal sanctions such as
fines, such a facility does face the threat that the EPA might
withdraw from the project, in which case the facility would have
to meet all applicable regulatory standards. 56
Consistent with the EPA's vision of Project XL, which views
government as a facilitator of a collaborative regulatory venture,
violations of EPA regulations that come to light because of the
company's participation in the XL program warrant "a range of
local stakeholders. See Berry Corp. Website, supra note 248. Stakeholders listed in
the Berry FPA include The Nature Conservancy and the Audubon Society. See id.
Merck's FPA includes the Southern Environmental Law Center and the Natural
Resources Defense Council as stakeholders. See Merck & Co. Website, supra note
248. By comparison, the Intel and Weyerhaeuser projects involve mostly small, local
stakeholders. See Stakeholder Team Contacts (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http-/yosemite.epa.
gov/x/xlhome.nsf/allfmtelbfpaattach5.html>; Weyerhaeuser Website, supra note 250.
252. Pollution may occur in any of these mediums-air, water, and land.
253. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,874
(1997).
254. "Each project will have an enforceable component, described in the final
project agreement (FPA), but also contained in a legally binding document, such as a
permit, rulemaking, or administrative order." Id. at 19,875. An FPA also may con-
tain voluntary commitments, "for which a facility may be held accountable through
means other than... conventional legal [mechanisms]." Id. In addition, an FPA
may specify aspirations for the project that are not enforceable by any means, but
are relevant when the EPA decides whether to approve the XL proposal. See id.
255. See id. at 19,875 ("e type of accountability appropriate for a particular
commitment should be discussed within a projecfs stakeholder process and incorpo-
rated into the FPA.").
256. See id.
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mitigated enforcement responses-including the exercise of en-
forcement discretion not to pursue the violation ... .257 If a
violation of EPA regulations is discovered independent of the
company's participation in Project XL, the EPA states that it
will decide how to respond based upon its usual policies applied
outside of the XL context, but that the company's participation
in Project XL "may be considered a relevant factor for mitigating
penalties in the event a formal enforcement action is taken for
such violation(s)."258
2. The Benefits of the Project XL Program
The projects already approved by the EPA demonstrate that
for some pollution sources, Project XL promises caps on pollution
below current allowances and lower costs for the project sponsor.
For example, Intel has agreed nominally to meet more stringent
air pollution standards than currently required by regulation,259
and has promised to reduce fresh water use and generation of
hazardous waste at the site by aggressive recycling efforts.260
The standards to which the company holds itself appear to pose
no greater problem for enforcement than traditional environ-
mental standards. In return, Intel will not have to receive the
approval normally required for significant modifications of the
257. Steve Herman, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance's Operating
Principles for Project XL Participants (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http'J/yosemite.epa.
gov/xl/xl_home.nsf/all..o eca.html>.
258. Id.
259. The Intel plan is somewhat controversial because it allows the facility to
increase its current levels of air pollution without state approval. See Mohin, supra
note 250, at 10,351. Because the plant is not a major source subject to federal emis-
sion limits, state approval was the only air pollution constraint on the plant. See id.
at 10,350-51 & nn.52 & 56 (noting that Arizona Ambient Air Quality Guidelines are
unenforceable regulatory limits). Perhaps to avoid the appearance of getting some-
thing for nothing, Intel agreed that the facility would not increase air pollution
unless it also increased output, and that the facility will not increase emissions to
such an extent that it will constitute a major source subject to federal emission lim-
its. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 64 & n.190.
260. See Project XL: Final Project Agreement: 3 (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http:J/yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl-home.nsf/all/inteLfpa_.final3.html> (stating Inters overall
water recycling commitment to the City of Chandler, Arizona); Project XL: Final
Project Agreement: 4 (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl-home.
nsf/allmtelfpafinal4.html> (outlining Intels commitment to increase its recycling of
solid waste, hazardous waste, and nonhazardous chemical waste).
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facility every time it changes its manufacturing operations.26' In
the fast-paced world of microprocessor development, freedom
from potential delays stemming from the state regulatory ap-
proval process is extremely valuable.262
Like the Intel FPA, most approved XL projects allow facilities
some freedom to alter the medium of pollution or the mix of
pollutants emitted.2" This promises to reduce the project
sponsors' regulatory compliance costs. Some critics of Project XL,
however, fear that "cross-media" and "cross-pollutant" trades
may allow the facility to alter the mix of emissions in a manner
that could pose greater threats to the environment than pre-FPA
operations. 26 Even proponents of Project XL agree that the envi-
ronmental benefit from such trades is difficult to establish objec-
tively.265 Therefore, the extent to which current XL projects have
improved environmental performance over what would have
occurred without Project XL is uncertain.
One of the EPA's major hopes is that site-specific pilot pro-
jects will develop creative regulatory schemes that the agency
then can adopt for entire industries.266 Thus far, the EPA's ex-
pectation that regulatory mechanisms created in XL plans could
be transferred to other facilities has not materialized.267
261. See Final Project Agreement Website, supra note 250 (allowing changes in
equipment and processes, provided air emissions are below Plant Site Emissions
Limits).
262. See Mohin, supra note 250, at 10,350.
263. See Letter from David G. Hawkins, Senior Attorney and Chris van Loben
Sels, Senior Project Analyst, NRDC, to Fred Hansen, Deputy Administrator, U.S.
EPA, David Gardiner, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA, and Keith Laughlin, Asso-
ciate Director, Council on Environmental Quality 1-2 (July 1, 1996) (visited Nov. 23,
1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xllxLhome.nsf/all/mer-7-3-96.html>.
264. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Jour-
ney from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 135-36 (1998).
265. See Mohin, supra note 250, at 10,352.
266. Thus, the EPA consistently has characterized the objective of Project XL as
the achievement of a "[b]roader implementation of cleaner, cheaper and smarter
ideas," Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872 (1997), and
the EPA has premised the program on the intent "to transfer successful approaches
into the current system of environmental protection." Id.; see also 60 Fed. Reg.
27,282, 27,287 (1995) (specifying transferability to other facilities or industries as a
criterion for approval of XL proposals).
267. An electronic search of the Federal Register from 1995 through July 30, 1998
revealed no regulations for entire industries resulting from a final project agreement
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3. The Extent to Which Project XL Implements a Collaborative
Approach to Regulation
Project XL calls for stakeholder participation in the negotia-
tion and implementation of XL projects. At the very least, the
project must involve the owner of the facility covered by the
FPA, the EPA, and state or tribal environmental agencies."'
Stakeholders in a project could also include local officials, rep-
resentatives of individuals who potentially could be exposed to
pollution from the facility, facility workers, neighboring business
owners, and national or local environmental groups. 9
The EPA has distinguished three levels of stakeholder partici-
pation: direct participants, conmenters, and the general
public.27 0 Direct participants engage in intensive negotiation of
the plan itself.27 1 The authority of direct stakeholders over the
decisions of the project sponsor in negotiating the plan "should
be determined at the outset by the stakeholders themselves."2 72
Thus the extent to which a stakeholder has veto power over a
plan depends on the authority worked out by direct stakeholders
early in the process. Commenters do not work directly on the
plan, but must be informed regularly about issues being negoti-
ated and given the opportunity to communicate their views on
these issues.2 7 3 The EPA states that the views of commenters
will be used to evaluate the potential for wider application of the
project's innovative approach to regulationY.2 4 The general public
must have easy access to the project development and any en-
vironmental results of the project.275
Although the EPA has stated that "all stakeholders who ex-
press a timely desire to be direct participants and understand
the commitment involved should be given the opportunity to do
under Project XL. Search of WESTLAW, Federal Register Database (Nov. 23, 1999).
268. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,284.
269. See id. at 27,287.
270. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,877-78.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 19,879.
273. See id. at 19,877.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 19,878.
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so,"2176 the project sponsor is responsible for selecting stakeholder
representatives and determining at what level they will partici-
pate. 7 To date, the EPA generally has deferred to the selection
of the representatives of the community's interests made by
project applicants. 8
National environmental groups generally have not actively
participated in many XL projects.279 This is understandable
because participation on a committee of representatives to devel-
op a plan for a particular facility does not promise notoriety that
national group leaders can parlay into increased membership.
Nor does such participation generate revenues for a participat-
ing group."' In addition, project sponsors are unlikely to suggest
276. See id. at 19,879.
277. See id. (stating that the "EPA will not determine the membership of the
group of direct participants, but may advise sponsors of whether it believes the
group as assembled is consistent with the guidance contained in [the Federal Regis-
ter notice regarding XL projects]"); see also id. at 19,878 (noting that the EPA leaves
to sponsors the responsibility to "do as much of the groundwork as possible to en-
gage appropriate stakeholders before formally proposing an XL project to EPA).
278. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 77; see also Bradford C. Mank, The Environ-
mental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The
Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 73 (1998) (criticizing the
discretion that the EPA has given to XL project sponsors over selection of direct
stakeholders). For example, the staff at Jack M. Berry, Inc., selected initial
stakeholders with whom they had previously worked, see Telephone Interview with
Ernie Caldwell, Vice President, Jack M. Berry, Inc., (July 2, 1998), and the EPA
ultimately accepted this list of stakeholders.
279. Of the first seven XL projects approved, only those of Berry and Merck
claim to include national groups whose sole focus as stakeholders is the environ-
ment. But even these projects curtailed the participation by groups unlikely to com-
promise on environmental values. Merck included these groups as commenters but
not as direct participants in the FPA negotiations. See infra notes 285-89 and ac-
companying text. Berry included environmental stakeholders on the committee that,
in theory, was to negotiate the FPA, but "the committee's actual involvement in the
Berry FPA was minimal." Freeman, supra note 2, at 78. Moreover, one of the na-
tional groups that participated in the Berry FPA negotiations, The Nature
Conservancy, by its own account, engages in nonconfrontational methods for promot-
ing long-term survival of all viable native species through the conservation of sites
most representative of a region's biodiversity. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CON-
SERVATION BY DESIGN: A FRAMEWORK FOR MISSION SUCCESS 1-2 (David Williamson
ed., 1996). The other group, the Audubon Society, is known as a group characterized
by a professional and corporate structure that emphasizes cooperation with industry.
See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERI-
CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 151-54 (1993) (detailing the historical development
of the Audubon Society's environmental ethos).
280. According to one industry representative in Project XL negotiation: "If
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national groups as stakeholders. Such sponsors are usually not
interested in environmental protection for its own sake, but
rather in minimizing their cost of compliance with regulations
and their exposure to lawsuits for regulatory violations.281 Corpo-
rate leaders also face incentives to avoid risks to short-term
profits that might result from seeking creative solutions to envi-
ronmental problems that promise only long-term benefits.8 2
Thus, they are especially apt to be wary of participating in col-
laborative endeavors with groups that previously had engaged in
litigation and other antagonistic behavior towards industry.
Project sponsors are likely to work directly with nonadversarial
local groups or stakeholder representatives chosen by local gov-
ernments, who may be more amenable to compromise and less
likely to sue if they do not get their way in plan negotiations.283
Unlike members of local environmental groups, most members
of national groups are unconnected to the community in which
stakeholders do not directly appropriate any of the benefits of a more efficient sys-
tem, they are seemingly uninterested in spending their limited resources on improv-
ing efficiency." Mohin, supra note 250, at 10,353; see also Steinzor, supra note 264,
at 155 (noting that lower cost regulation does not provide an incentive for environ-
mental group participation in Project XL).
281. See JOEL MAKOWER, BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BEYOND THE
BOTroM LINE: PUITINQG SocIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK FOR YOUR BUSINESS AND
THE WORLD 115-16 (1994) (listing reasons that companies "go green" as including
"lower operating costs and increased profit margins, reduced oversight by regulators,
increased customer satisfaction and loyalty, and increased competitiveness in the
global marketplace"); ALAN REDER, IN PURSUIT OF PRINcIPLE AND PROFIT: BUSINESS
SUCCESS THROUGH SOcIAL RESPONSIBmLTY 133-37 (1994) (suggesting that companies
develop environmental compliance strategies to strengthen their image against poten-
tial litigation and to improve marketability of their products); Donald A. Carr &
William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under the ISO 14000 Interna-
tional Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 87 (1997).
282. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS
81-92 (1988); Claudia H. Deutsch, For Wall Street, Increasing Evidence that Green
Begets Green, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, § 3, at 7 (reporting corporations' skepticism
about implementing environmentally sound practices despite evidence that companies
that do so fare better than others).
283. This is borne out in the list of direct stakeholders in various projects, all of
which have included local officials or representatives appointed by local government,
but few of which have included environmental groups that have engaged in environ-
mental litigation. See XL Implementation Website, supra note 239; see also Caldart &
Ashford, supra note 231, at 26-27 (noting the exclusion of two vociferous opponents
to Intel's XL project-the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition and the NRDC-from the
list of direct participants that negotiated the Intel FPA).
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the XL facility is located and have little incentive to mollify any
anti-industry feelings they may harbor.2s Moreover, agreeing to
allow a facility to pollute beyond levels allowed by any current
regulation might be viewed by members as "selling out" to in-
dustry. Thus, national environmental organizations would be
more apt to take unreasonable positions because institutionally
they are more likely to be harmed rather than benefitted by ac-
ceding to tradeoffs that allow reasonable, but currently prohibit-
ed, levels of pollution.
Merck's XL project seems to have included the most signifi-
cant input from national and regional environmental groups.285
Although Merck included the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and the Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) as
stakeholders, the company included them only as commenters
and did not allow them to participate directly in negotiating the
FPA.286 Moreover, although Merck's proposed FPA called for
review and potential modifications of the agreement every five
years,281 it excluded representatives of environmental groups
from direct participation in these reviews despite strong objec-
284. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Ad-
visory Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 917 (1998) (sug-
gesting that grassroots local citizen groups may be more accountable to the public
interest than well-organized national interest groups); Mank, supra note 278, at 62
(noting that local environmental groups are sometimes closer to the interests of the
average citizen than national environmental groups).
285. A representative of Intel on its XL project negotiating team asserted that
Intel developed the most "extensive and inclusionary" XL process. Mohin, supra note
250, at 10,348. The national groups that Intel included as representative of environ-
mental interests-the Campaign for Responsible Technology and the American Public
Health Association, see id. at 10,349 & n.35,--do not focus solely on environmental
issues and do not come to mind readily when one thinks of national environmental
groups. Moreover, Intel used the breadth of stakeholder representation to its advan-
tage by defining consensus as agreement by each of three categories of stakeholders:
(1) Intel employees; (2) community members; and (3) regulators. See id. at 10,349 &
n.37; see also Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,879 (1997)
(providing that direct stakeholder participants should determine whether group views
will be reached by full consensus, majority vote, or subgroup consensus). These
ground rules prevented environmental groups from exercising a veto over any as-
pects of the FPA with which they disagreed, no matter how strong that disagree-
ment.
286. See Merck & Co. Website, supra note 248.
287. See Merck XL Site-Specific Rulemaking Response to Comments Document
(visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http//yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/allIresponse.html>.
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tions by both the NRDC and SELC.28" Nonetheless, the EPA
approved the Merck FPA's provisions governing participation,
essentially agreeing with Merck that inclusion of community
representatives appointed by the local government and public
interest representatives chosen by government signatories to the
FPA was more appropriate than inclusion of representatives of
groups that the project would not directly affect.289
If local environmental groups could be trusted to represent
environmental interests adequately, then such groups might be
preferable to national groups as participants in XL projects.
Members of local groups are usually local residents, who have
some incentive to consider the economic benefits of having an
XL facility operate as well as the environmental harm from such
a facility.290 Local advocates of environmental protection are
more likely to get involved in a site-specific plan under Project
XL because such plans tend to make local headlines and, at
least in the short run, consume the attention of local residents.
These advocates, however, often lack both the time to commit to
the endeavor and the expertise needed to participate meaning-
fully in the process.29' This lack of expertise often makes them
wary of negotiation with the company, which can contribute to a
failure of negotiations.2 92 Despite those weaknesses, many local
groups are. strong environmental advocates.293 Like organizers of
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See Mank, supra note 278, at 62 (claiming that "[s]ometimes .. . local envi-
ronmental movements are closer to the interests of the average citizen than national
environmental groups").
291. See id. at 61; Steinzor, supra note 264, at 142, 144-45.
292. See Gail Bingham, ADR Procedures: Variations on the Negotiation Theme, 56
A.L.I.-A.B.A 265, 312 (1998) (explaining that natural resource issues are complex
and require a variety of expertise, and that environmental organizations often have
volunteer staff whose lack of training and resources prevent them from participating
in negotiating such issues in an informed manner); Steinzor, supra note 264, at 180-82.
293. See Steinzor, supra note 264, at 180 (asserting that the conviction of grass-
roots environmental activists "lends an emotional edge to their advocacy, deepening
their resolve"); see also GOTTLIEB, supra note 279, at 170, 202-03 (describing the
development of an alternative environmental movement of local organizations, which
often find mainstream environmental groups too quick to compromise fundamental
values); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AmERiCAN ENviRoniENTAL
MOVEMENT 233-34 (1993) (explaining the growing influence of local environmental
groups).
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national groups, leaders of local activist groups have a rep-
utational stake in.taking inflexible, antidevelopment positions
even if their communities might be affected adversely by barri-
ers to economic development.2" Thus, applicants also prefer to
exclude representatives of local activist environmental groups,
favoring instead representatives chosen by local officials. 295 Of-
ten, these representatives are professionals, such as environ-
mental engineers from the community, who are more apt to be
receptive to the company's ultimate plan. This fosters negotia-
tion of a workable agreement, but at the expense of representa-
tion of "die-hard" environmentalists' interests.
Representatives of environmental interests are even less capa-
ble of monitoring and enforcing FPAs than they are in helping to
develop such plans. Usually, XL sites do not threaten environ-
mental catastrophes, and without a salient threat of such catas-
trophes, leaders of environmental groups cannot utilize day-to-
day monitoring activities in an entrepreneurial fashion to in-
crease support for their causes. In addition, FPA enforcement is
based on a compliance model, which proactively seeks to prevent
violations, rather than a deterrence model, which penalizes
294. See SUSSKIND & CRUJKSHANK, supra note 137, at 207 (counseling group lead-
ers that they must decide which they need most, a resolution of the dispute or the
increase in membership that may result from intransigent opposition to the "ene-
my").
295. See DANIEL P. BEARDSLEY, GLOBAL ENVTL. MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, INCEN-
TIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT, AN ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED INNOVATIVE
PROGRAMS IN THE STATES AND EuROPE 13, 31 (1996) (reporting that industry partici-
pants in domestic and European environmental alternative compliance programs
consider "a sine qua non for the likely success of the demonstration program [to be]
the rather limited role throughout of public environmental organizations"). Recently,
Lucent Technologies purported to involve local environmental organizations in its XL
project, but its actual commitment to empowering such groups is suspect. See Lucent
Technologies Final Project Agreement, (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http'/yosemite.
epa.gov/xl/xlhome.nsf/all/Dra_FPA_6_24_98.html>. Thus far, Lucent has entered
into an "umbrella" FPA to implement Environmental Management Systems at its
various facilities. See id. As part of this metaplan, Lucent commits to creating a
Local Environmental Advisory Group (LEAG) at each site. See id. The LEAG, howev-
er, will not be made up solely of environmental interest groups, but rather will
include all "local stakeholders, including environmental organizations, community
groups, employees, and other interested citizens." Id. Moreover, the LEAGs will play
purely advisory roles and will not have signatory status for any local FPA that
Lucent and state and federal authorities may work out ultimately. See id.
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violations after the fact.296 Such enforcement requires ongoing
monitoring of detailed data about facility performance, and an
understanding of the facility's operations in order to determine
whether poor performance is just a happenstance, rather than a
signal of problems with the FPA, or even an indication of lack of
good faith cooperation by the project sponsor.297 Hence, stake-
holder monitoring of a facility's performance after an XL plan is
implemented often will involve a greater and more consistent
long run investment of resources than does initial plan develop-
ment.298 Even if representatives of local groups happen to have
the time to invest in regular monitoring and fine-tuning of
FPAs, they almost invariably do not have the expertise to collect
their own data on the facility's performance or even to review
company data critically. Thus, the monitoring role generally
devolves to the project sponsor, with checks by EPA and state or
local government officials. Project XL envisions that the sponsor
will make available to stakeholders and the public information
that will allow national environmental groups to get more in-
volved in enforcement of a sponsor's performance; the sponsor
must issue reports about the XL site's performance, 299 and if
296. See Reiss, supra note 50, at 23-26 (describing the differences between compli-
ance and deterrence models of enforcement); see also Regulatory Reinvention (XL)
Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,875 (1997) (noting that FPAs will contain voluntary
commitments that are not legally enforceable but rather are backed by the threat
that the stakeholders and the EPA may withdraw from the cooperative XL agree-
ment).
297. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 160 (explaining that flexible, i.e.,
compliance-based, enforcement requires time, knowledge, and money that even the
regulatory agency may lack); see also Reiss, supra note 50, at 25 (noting that for
effective compliance-based enforcement, "the relationship between enforcer and poten-
tial violator must be a continuing one").
298. Although negotiation of a plan may take close to a year of labor intensive
meetings, see, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 264, at 142 (reporting that negotiation of the
Intel FPA took 10 months), the project itself might last indefinitely and call for
reviews of performance on a periodic basis, see e.g., Merck & Co. Website, supra note
248 (providing that the stakeholder group will reconvene every five years to evaluate
the projects implementation and determine if any changes are needed); Project XL:
Final Project Agreement: 12 (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http:J/yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl_home.
nsf/all/mteLfpafinall2.html> (promising to hold semiannual public meetings to dis-
cuss quarterly reports and to reassemble the Community Advisory Panel in three
years to evaluate Intel's progress towards its five year plan); Weyerhaeuser Website,
supra note 250 (providing for an annual meeting with stakeholders to discuss Project
XL performance).
299. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,875, 19,881
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these reports indicate clear violations of regulations, other than
those from which government officials have exempted the facility
pursuant to the FPA, national environmental groups might
threaten to sue the sponsor. Despite the Project XL rhetoric of
stakeholder empowerment, however, this compliance mechanism
does not differ from that under traditional regulation.
4. Constraints on the Universality of Project XL as a Means of
Setting General Standards
In addition to failing to implement a truly collaborative regu-
latory process, Project XL is simply incapable of replacing tradi-
tional regulatory processes for setting national, industry-wide
standards. The cost of developing Project XL FPAs is too great
for the XL process to become the primary means for setting
environmental standards across the nation. °0  To date, experi-
ence with approved XL plans demonstrates that negotiating an
FPA takes hundreds of hours of meetings between direct stake-
holder representatives. 1 Presumably stakeholder groups spend
similar amounts of time meeting with their own representatives
to work out their negotiating positions and to evaluate the vari-
ous issues being considered at any time by the negotiating com-
mittee. Expenditure of such resources may be justified for estab-
lishing general environmental standards, but an FPA governs
only a single company, usually at a single site. Neither the gov-
(reaffirming the EPA's original guideline that the FPA should specify how the project
sponsor will make performance data "available to stakeholders in a form that is
easily understandable").
300. See GLOBAL ENVTL. MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, INDUSTRY INCENTIVES FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT. COMBINED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR THREE REPORTS
SUBMITTED TO THE IDEA 21 WORK GROUP OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGE-
MENT INITIATIVE 3 (1996) (stating that against a backdrop of weak incentives for
participation and risks of litigation and other failures, "companies are increasingly
discouraged by the unexpectedly high transaction costs of participation"). For exam-
ple, by September 1997, Intel had spent close to $1 million developing its Project XL
initiative. See Dan Beardsley et al., Improving Environmental Management: What
Works, What Doesn't, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1997, at 6, 28.
301. For example, negotiating the Intel FPA entailed 100 meetings of dirdet
stakeholders each lasting four to six hours. See Participants in Project XL to Meet,
Discuss Problems with Stakeholder Process, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), Jan. 13, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, Topic Materials by Area of Practice Library, BNA-NED File
(quoting a citizen participant in the Intel negotiating process who claimed to have
attended 70 of the 100 meetings).
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ernment, regulated entities, nor stakeholders could afford this
commitment of resources to the regulatory process if they had to
negotiate a separate FPA in order to regulate pollution at each
individual facility.30 2 Moreover, the extremely burdensome and
often irksome negotiations that project design and implemen-
tation entail can undermine rather than reinforce a close rela-
tionship between the regulator and the firm that permits Project
XL to escape from the adversarial structure of traditional regu-
lation." 3 Thus, if every facility had to negotiate an FPA, more
often than not, the result would not be an agreement supported
by all direct stakeholders.
Another reason why Project XL cannot replace traditional
regulatory processes is because the XL process relies on existing
standards, which are set using traditional regulation. Existing
standards provide a yardstick against which the EPA can evalu-
ate a project's potential for superior environmental perfor-
mance-one of the key factors in the EPA's decision to commit to
an XL project.0 4 The EPA will not approve an FPA that will
result in a violation of any "ecological health or risk-based envi-
ronmental standards 3° 5-- that is, any standard that if exceeded
would unduly threaten human health or other environmental
interests. 06 In addition, the EPA considers the extent to which
302. See Caldart & Ashford, supra note 231, at 27-28 (reporting that the EPA
and other Project XL participants now consider the XL negotiations so burdensome
that the program probably will not survive).
303. According to one analysis of the Project XL, stakeholder negotiations "require
exchanges so intimate, particular, and extended between the state, the private actor,
and other concerned parties, as almost inevitably to suggest to some of the partici-
pants that others are colluding against them, even when they are not." Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUMI.
L. REV. 267, 384 (1998).
304. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 26, at 10 (suggesting that alternative
compliance schemes can only supplement, rather than replace, current regulatory
systems because "[t]he current system is needed to serve as a benchmark for perfor-
mance as new methods are tested").
305. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,874 (1997).
306. A risk-based standard chooses the level of harm to health or the environ-
ment that society finds acceptable and attempts to reduce pollution to decrease the
harm below that level at the cheapest possible cost. See OGUS, supra note 58, at
161 (discussing how standards set to achieve a particular goal can relieve a regula-
tor from having to compare costs and benefits of regulation); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONmENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 151 (1992) (describing
health or environment-based regulation and noting its relation to costs and benefits
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an XL proposal involving a new or expanded facility promises to
reduce particular emissions of a pollutant into a medium below
levels required by existing regulations in evaluating tradeoffs
that free the facility from meeting technology-based standards
with respect to other media or pollutants.3 0 7 Thus, without exist-
ing health and technology-based standards, the EPA would not
have an adequately objective means to evaluate a project's envi-
ronmental performance.
Additionally, if one restricts the XL pilot program to projects
that deliver greater environmental protections than those cur-
rently required by law, 8  they are attractive only to the rare
entities for whom the value of flexibility and freedom from regu-
lar agency review exceeds the significant cost of developing
plans and meeting greater environmental controls. °9 It is not
surprising that in the four years since the announcement of Pro-
ject XL, far fewer companies than expected have proposed XL
projects, many companies that initially proposed projects with-
drew their proposals, and the EPA has approved only a handful
of proposed Project XL agreements. 10
of regulation).
307. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed Reg. at 19,874
("Where the project includes new facilities . . . or expansion of existing facilities . . .
the benchmark will be set at the level of performance generally representative of
industry practice, or the future allowable environmental loadings [under existing
regulations] . . . whichever is more protective."). A technology-based standard chooses
a level of pollution prevention technology that society believes appropriate or afford-
able and attempts to minimize environmental harms to that which efficient use of
such technology would achieve. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 306, at 151-52 (dis-
cussing technology-based regulation and noting its relation to costs and benefits of
regulation); cf OGUS, supra note 58, at 161 (discussing how regulators might imple-
ment a standard according to budgetary limits rather than harms caused by the
regulated activity).
308. Current EPA guidelines require that an XL facility deliver superior environ-
mental performance. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at
19,873. Much commentary, however, has suggested that equivalent environmental
performance at lower cost should also be a legitimate goal of alternative compliance
programs. See, e.g., Mohin, supra note 250, at 10,353; Steinzor, supra note 264, at 188.
309. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 303, at 384. According to some observers,
"[tihe legal, enforcement, and methodological constraints built into Project XL do not
appear to permit facilities to adopt the kinds of daring new approaches that could
result in significant economic benefits to them." Beardsley et al., supra note 300, at 28.
310. As of July 1999, more than 4 years after the Project XL program was an-
nounced, only 13 XL projects were being implemented (11 sponsored by private in-
dustry). By that date, the EPA had approved proposals for seven additional facilities
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5. Conclusions with Respect to Project XL as a Means of
Empowering Stakeholders
Project XL has demonstrated that site-specific negotiations
between regulated entities, regulators, and stakeholders can
develop more reasonable means of achieving regulatory goals in
some situations. In particular, where flexibility to change pro-
duction processes is especially valuable, Project XL can achieve
modest environmental improvement over traditional regulation
at lower cost. But, the successes of individual XL projects derive
as much from Project XL's relationship to traditional regulatory
processes as from its departure from such processes. Project XL
is more a variation on traditional regulatory processes than it is
a radical empowerment of stakeholders. Project XL merely speci-
fies a mechanism for stakeholders to provide information about
site-specific regulation and to work out compromises of funda-
mental disagreements in the early stages of regulatory develop-
ment. 11 The EPA retains authority to reject an FPA that the
agency determines fails to meet Project XL criteria and to ap-
prove a project even if the stakeholders do not reach a consensus
about the FPA."1 The EPA and state regulators remain the pri-
mary institutions for monitoring compliance with an FPA.
The Project XL process does not reflect truly collaborative
regulation. To ensure that the XL process re mains tractable,
project sponsors and the EPA essentially have had to limit the
inclusion of the most aggressive environmental groups. Were the
EPA to require greater empowerment of environmental interest
groups, it is doubtful that industry would have participated even
to the very limited extent it has,3 13 and it is doubtful that ne-
(two sponsored by private industry), and the owners of these facilities have convened
"stakeholder teams" to develop XL plans. In addition, 5 other entities (3 public and
2 private), which had submitted Project XL proposals to the EPA, entered into
agreements facilitated by the XL program but not "full-fledged" XL projects, and 31
proposals have been withdrawn or rejected by the agency (24 sponsored by private
industry). See XL Implementation Website, supra note 239.
311. See Mobin, supra note 250, at 10,354 (noting that the stakeholder process is
not meant to transfer the government authority to regulate to private groups, but
only "to provide concerned citizen volunteers better access to the system to make
their concerns and views known and understood").
312. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,879.
313. See BEARDSLEY, supra note 295, at 13, 31 (noting industry's perception that
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gotiating groups could have agreed on cross-media and cross-
pollutant trades that have driven FPAs thus far. 14 In addition,
the site-by-site negotiation process inherent in Project XL is too
expensive and too dependent on a background of existing regula-
tion to replace traditional regulation as a broad-based means of
curtailing pollution. 15 Thus, the result of Project XL has been,
and most likely will continue to be, a few agreements that ac-
commodate select facilities' needs to lower regulatory costs but
do not promise significant environmental improvement at the
national level or creative breakthroughs about how to address
pollution problems generally.
IV. CONTEXTS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESSFUL EMPOWERMENT
The theory of interest group formation and dynamics identi-
fies two major threats to collaborative regulation: co-option and
extremist obstruction. Proponents of collaboration look to
contestability of group leadership to steer groups between the
Scylla and Charybdis of these threats. Contestability itself, how-
ever, is in tension with the norm of cooperation that a group
must share if it is to participate constructively in collaborative
regulation. Contestability would require that any faction of an
interest group can claim a place at the regulatory table, and
there will always be some uncooperative faction ready to feast.
Experiences with negotiated rulemaking, citizen suits, and Pro-
ject XL illustrate how these threats can undermine collaborative
regulation, but also suggest situations in which these threats
can be avoided. The key to avoiding these threats lies in the
ability of the government to establish internal group mecha-
active participation by public interest groups is a significant threat to the openness
between industry and regulators that is necessary for the success of environmental
alternative compliance programs).
314. Part of the problem with trying to obtain consensus on cross-media pollution
shifts reflects the difficulty of evaluating the overall impact of such shifts, and the
structure of current environmental statutes, which set standards in terms of particu-
lar pollution mediums. See Robert W. Hahn & Eric H. Males, Can Regulatory Insti-
tutions Cope with Cross Media Pollution?, 40 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASSN 24, 29
(1990).
315. See Beardsley et al., supra note 300, at 28 (noting that the transaction costs
of Project XL have exceeded expectations).
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nisms that ensure group leaders' accountability to putative bene-
ficiaries of regulation without empowering extremist obstruction-
ist factions among such beneficiaries. After extracting lessons
from negotiated rulemaking, citizen suits, and Project XL about
how empowerment can fail to implement collaborative regulato-
ry processes, this Part describes contextual and structural predi-
cates for the establishment of mechanisms that may lead to
successful collaborative regulatory schemes.
A. Lessons from Experiments with Empowering Regulatory
Beneficiaries
Evaluating negotiated rulemaking, Project XL, and citizen
suits within the framework of interest group dynamics provides
lessons about the contexts in which empowerment is likely to
increase regulatory flexibility without subverting the public
interest. Groups that are excluded entirely from the regulatory
process are apt to act antagonistically towards the outcome of
that process. 16 The negotiated rulemaking experience reinforces
that cooperative processes involving interest groups are fragile
and hence susceptible to being undermined by those left out.
3 17
Pragmatically, however, inclusion of every narrowly defined
specific interest in a collaborative regulatory process is impossi-
ble. 18 Thus, successful collaborative regulation depends on the
establishment of a process for excluding groups not likely to
collaborate in good faith that neither destroys beneficiaries'
ability to check agency capture nor forfeits the goodwill created
by the involvement of beneficiary groups.
To the extent that participants view a regulatory proceeding
as a single-shot game, they will act strategically to maximize
their short-run payoff, often eschewing cooperative behavior in
316. See Coglianese, supra note 140, at 1323 (noting the propensity of groups left
out of negotiated rulemaking to challenge the ultimate rule).
317. See id.
318. See Daniel Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Form of Public Participation,
in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR
ENvIRoNmENTAL DISCOURSE 223, 236 (Ortwin lonn et al. eds., 1995); Harter, supra
note 157, at 1405; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 1210 (noting the tension be-
tween the need for participation in negotiated rulemaking to be inclusive, meaning-
ful, and still not involve too many distinct groups).
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the process. 19 This might explain why participants in negotiated
regulation can reach accords about standards that require some
compromise and then resume an adversarial stance once the
negotiations conclude. Experience with negotiated rulemaking
thus counsels that empowerment is unlikely to alleviate ad-
versarial interactions unless the collaborative process is ongo-
ing. 2 ' Project XL, however, teaches that, at least for local, site-
specific regulation, ongoing participation may be too costly and
require too much expertise for directly affected stakeholders to
participate meaningfully in the process. 2' Moreover, the Project
XL program indicates that industry often will demand the abili-
ty to prescreen interest group participants as a condition to
engaging in an ongoing collaborative venture. Consequently, the
Project XL experience reinforces the theoretical prediction that
when groups engage in long-term, cooperative endeavors with
regulators, the process is especially susceptible to co-option of
group leaders. Thus, the requirement for successful collaborative
regulation-that the various stakeholder groups interact on a
long-term, ongoing basis-increases the potential for co-option.
In turn, this potential creates the need for a mechanism that
makes group leadership accountable, yet also allows the exclu-
sion of extremist factions from the regulatory process.
The foregoing analysis of how citizen suits have operated also
adds to the concerns identified in the earlier discussion of inter-
est group dynamics. Citizen suits clearly provide a means to
circumvent agency refusals to impose penalties for regulatory
319. Many aspects of regulatory processes present what game theorists call a
prisoner's dilemma-a situation in which each participant maximizes its benefit from
the regulatory process by refusing to cooperate with other participants. See BAIRD ET
AL., supra note 60, at 33-34 (discussing the prisoner's dilemma); Scholz, supra note
59, at 185-88 (describing how regulatory enforcement can be modeled as a prisoner's
dilemma).
320. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 72 (concluding that regulatory negotiation
fails to achieve the full benefits of collaboration because it does not continue past
the development of the regulation into the implementation phase). Ongoing processes
may be modeled as supergames-infinite reiterations of single-shot subgames. If the
subgame at each decision-making point is a prisoner's dilemma, the supergame may
still allow a cooperative strategy that maximizes each participant's benefit from the
process. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 60, at 166-72 (describing the criteria for coop-
erative strategies to be equilibria of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma).
321. See supra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
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violations, but they also threaten the broader agency framework
established to obtain regulatory compliance at a reasonable cost
because such suits strongly dissuade regulated entities from co-
operating with regulators. 22 In addition, allowing national inter-
est groups, whose leaders might not pursue the material inter-
ests of purported statutory beneficiaries, to sue regulatory viola-
tors for penalties also discourages cooperative interactions be-
tween representatives of putative beneficiaries and regulated
firms." Ultimately, experiences with negotiated rulemaking,
Project XL, and citizen suits lead to the conclusion that the full
potential of collaborative regulation requires limiting empower-
ment to groups whose leaders can be made to share the interests
of group members.
B. Structuring Accountable Empowerment
Several mechanisms might be used to ensure that empowered
groups are accountable to the interests of the members they
represent. One mechanism for weeding out groups that are un-
likely to represent their members' interests appropriately, and
who thus pose a threat to undermine a cooperative regulatory
venture, would rely on the responsible agency to select which
groups to empower. To reduce effectively the potential for ex-
tremist groups to obstruct the collaborative endeavor, groups
excluded from participation would also have to be precluded
from challenging the ultimate regulatory compact in order to
322. In other words, citizen suits threaten the agency's enforcement agenda, which
is a substantial part of the policy underlying a regulatory scheme. See Rossi, supra
note 122, at 223.
323. For example, the threat of citizen suits is a major impediment to companies
participating in self-audit programs despite EPA promises generally not to impose
penalties for violations uncovered by such audits. See Geltman & Mathews, supra
note 232, at 406; State Attorneys Quiz Browner, supra note 232. A 1995 study of
industry sectors with more than 100 employees and whose annual sales exceeded
$100 million revealed that, of the companies that did conduct environmental audits
(nearly 75% of those polled), 45% were hesitant to expand their auditing program
because they feared their self-policing would be used against them in citizen suits
and enforcement actions. See PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 232, at 28; see
also supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text (discussing the drawbacks of citizen
suits on enforcement as a cooperative venture between the agency and the regulated
entity).
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prevent them from retaliating for exclusion from the process.
The agency's role would thus go further than the one it currently
plays in choosing negotiated rulemaking committees, and per-
haps further than the American polity would tolerate, because
the agency would have the power to exclude an interest group
from participation in all phases of the regulatory process, includ-
ing judicial review.3 n
Allowing agencies to exclude groups from the regulatory pro-
cess entirely, however, would be problematic because it might
allow agencies to exclude those groups most likely to oppose a
sweetheart regulatory deal between the agency and other groups
that participate in the process. No bright line demarcates good
faith aggressive advocacy of beneficiaries' interests from obstruc-
tionist or strategic behavior. Thus, for an agency intent upon
shielding its regulatory outcomes from the meaningful judicial
challenges by some affected interest groups, illegitimate exclu-
sion of a zealous interest group could masquerade as a defense
against obstructionist abuse of the group's right to participate.
Vesting authority in regulators to choose which representatives
of interest groups can participate in the regulatory process also
provides a means for regulators to co-opt leaders of groups likely
to oppose the regulatory scheme that officials would prefer. 25
Moreover, the very appearance of a conflict of interest that aris-
es because the agency has a stake in avoiding scrutiny by dedi-
cated opponents of industry would erode confidence in the collab-
orative regulatory system and thereby undermine the political
foundation of such a system. 26 These are the precise concerns
324. This mechanism corresponds more closely with European corporatism than
with the empowerment of groups in open network systems. Corporatism involves for-
mal designation of private organizations as "partners with the state for the develop-
ment and implementation of public policy." HANDLER, supra note 57, at 244. The
partners do not vary with the precise issues and the external environment surround-
ing the regulatory endeavor. The collaboration that reformers in the United States
advocate involves joint effort by a shifting set of organizations that are themselves
responsive to changes in the politics and preferences of individuals who Will feel the
effects of regulatory decisions. See id. at 244-45.
325. See id. at 242; MARY GRiSEZ KwEIT & ROBERT W. KWErr, IMPLEMENTING
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY APPROACH 99
(1981).
326. The state might influence the nature of the groups that can participate effec-
tively in the collaborative process less directly by providing information and resourc-
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that have led many environmental groups to oppose Project XL.
I do not mean to suggest that relying on the agency to choose
the stakeholders it believes will engage in good faith in a collab-
orative endeavor will never prove worthwhile. Convening repre-
sentatives of those directly affected by regulation for face-to-face
brainstorming can help the agency distinguish credible informa-
tion from that provided purely for strategic purposes. 27 Such
face-to-face sessions can also facilitate development of creative
solutions that otherwise might elude regulators.3 28 But, the
threat of co-option when the agency controls participation sug-
gests that any use of such an agency-chosen collaborative com-
mittee must include ch~cks to ensure that the negotiating com-
mittee neither lulls group representatives into agreeing to provi-
sions that their groups later decide not to accept, nor subverts
the process for gain of included interests at the expense of those
excluded. Thus, in the negotiated rulemaking setting, it is im-
portant that the agency does not simply defer to the end product
of the negotiating committee, but rather sends the negotiated
proposal to a rulemaking team comprised of staff members from
various agency offices to evaluate whether it should be proposed
as a rule. 29 In addition, the threat of co-option of both group
representatives and the agency counsels against courts paying
any more deference to rules that result from negotiation than
they do any other agency rule. 30 The larger point, though, is
es that allow leaders of groups that the regulators consider legitimate "to strengthen
their position vis-A-vis the rank-and-file and any potential challengers [for group lead-
ership]." HANDLER, supra note 57, at 230. But even such indirect sanctioning of par-
ticular leaders "raises the specter of domination and hierarchy within the group." Id.
327. See Caldart & Ashford, supra note 231, at 10 (reporting that in an EPA
negotiated rulemaking involving coke oven emissions, unions were able to convince
environmentalists that industry concerns-that applying the siatutory standard would
force the closing of most existing ovens-were valid).
328. See Freeman, supra note 2, at 46-47 (reporting how participants in the
EPA's equipment leaks negotiated rulemaking altered the whole conception of how
the rule should operate away from an emission standard and towards a total quality
management approach); Caldart & Ashford, supra note 231, at 19-22 (describing how
the EPA's wood furniture, coatings negotiated rule committee arrived at an innova-
tive solution instead of merely setting a standard).
329. Thus, my position is at odds with that of the father of negotiated
rulemaking, Phil Harter, who would require the agency to attempt to adopt promptly
the negotiated rule as drafted. See Harter, supra note 157, at 1410-12, 1418-20.
330. See Wald, supra note 146, at 1459-68 (explaining why courts should not use
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that guarding against co-option in the negotiation process neces-
sarily will render that process consultative rather than truly
collaborative.
Another mechanism would empower all affected groups ex
ante, subject to post hoc challenge to alleged abuse of regulatory
authority by any group. A determination of abuse after the fact,
however, will not cure the detrimental impact of such abuse.
Thus, to be effective, an ex post challenge to obstructionist con-
duct must provide some sanction to deter that conduct ex ante.
Sanctioning a private group's unacceptable use of regulatory
authority would be similar to Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous
lawsuits;3. and, the problems that have plagued such sanc-
tions... indicate that post hoc sanctions for abuse of regulatory
process are unlikely to be effective.
Prior to 1983, Rule 11 allowed judges to impose sanctions only
if a party acted in bad faith in litigating an issue.3 ' Under this
subjective standard, judges hesitated to impose sanctions be-
cause the state of mind constituting bad faith is essentially
impossible to prove.3 4 In 1983, in reaction to this hesitancy and
a perception of increased abuse of litigation, Rule 11 was
amended to include more objective proxies for bad faith as crite-
ria for imposing sanctions.335 Under the current rule,36 a lawyer
must demonstrate that she made a reasonable inquiry into the
facts and the law asserted in a filed paper, 33' and must certify
different standards or limit challengers to negotiated rules, but should take into
consideration information that the negotiations make available, such as consider-
ations of alternatives to the rule).
331. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
332. See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LIT-
IGATION ABUSE § 2 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the evolution of Rule 11).
333. See id. § 2(A)(1), at 6 (stating that "[glood faith or bad faith became irrele-
vant").
334. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 7, 7-10 (1994).
335. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 note (Proposed Amendments 1983), reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); Schwarzer, supra note 334, at 10.
336. The rule was amended again in 1993 to fine tune it to focus on attorney's
conduct rather than on the content of claims in assessing whether litigation was
frivolous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 note (Proposed Amendments 1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 401, 584 (1993); Schwarzer, supra note 334, at 12-13.
337. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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that, to the best of her knowledge, the "paper is well-grounded
in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."38
Even under this more objective standard, Rule 11 remains con-
troversial because it threatens to chill zealous advocacy, espe-
cially of claims that seek a change in the law.
39
Experience with Rule 11 suggests that post hoc sanctions for
noncooperative participation would not cure the problem of ob-
structionist interest groups. Fewer objective criteria can be used
to verify the good faith of a position taken by a group in a regu-
latory setting than in a judicial proceeding. Participants in reg-
ulation are not limited to asserting interests that are consistent
with existing or likely changes in law. The regulatory forum is
political, and in politics any position that advocates an outcome
within the power of the regulator to implement is "legitimate" as
long as it attracts sufficient support to remain viable in the
political arena.340 In other words, the criteria for distinguishing
338. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11--Some 'Chill-
ing" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J.
1313, 1318 (1986).
339. The controversy reflects the necessary tension between the desire to bar
obstructionist or vexatious litigation and the need to allow zealous pursuit of suits
intended in good faith to change the law. See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced
Approach to 'Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State
Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1132-34 (1994) (asserting that Rule 11
creates a problem of "drawing the line between frivolous claims ... and otherwise
legitimate novel or uncertain claims"); Nelken, supra note 338, at 1339 (expressing
concern that Rule 11 stifles the adversarial spirit of lawyers); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by Har-
monizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 259-60 &
n.19 (1991) (noting the tension Rule 11 creates between deterring and punishing
frivolous litigation while avoiding chilling zealous advocacy and restricting access to
courts, and citing a plethora of scholarly attempts to resolve this tension); Georgene
M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 42 (1994)
(contending that Rule 11 shifts the attorney-client relationship in a manner that
undermines zealous advocacy on behalf of the client).
340. I use the term "legitimate" descriptively, not normatively. Descriptively, poli-
tics differs from law because legitimate outcomes need not comport with stare decisis
or even be derived from any form of status quo ante reasoning. See RONALD
DwORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 226-27 (1986) (describing "law as integrity"); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (10th ed. 1979) (describing the role of precedent in law).
But cf RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 79-86 (1993) (con-
tending that the authority of law derives from the political accreditation of its
source, rather than from some reasoning process).
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good faith from purely obstructionist behavior depend on the
subjective judgments of what behavior is acceptable, and such
judgments are better screened by the political process than by
judicial reasoning. Thus, just as courts rarely sanctioned parties
for frivolous litigation under Rule l's subjective bad faith stan-
dards prior to 1983, regulators and courts reviewing a group
representative's conduct in a proceeding are unlikely to impose
sufficiently severe penalties to deter such groups from engaging
in unacceptable behavior for two reasons. First, even after the
fact, distinguishing good-faith advocacy from bad-faith strategic
behavior is difficult. Second, the American legal culture frowns
upon impediments to access to the political and legal systems. 4'
Together, these factors counsel against imposing threats for
abuse of the system that might deter legitimate complaints.
Perhaps a more promising mechanism for limiting empower-
ment would be a democratic process for interested individuals to
elect a representative to participate on their behalf in the regu-
latory process. Election by those directly affected could limit
participation to representatives of interests that enjoy substan-
tial support among beneficiaries-mainstream, rather than mar-
ginal interests. Election could also provide a direct check against
group leaders pursuing personal goals at the expense of regula-
tory beneficiaries. From the perspective of the regulator, elec-
tions allow for the ascendancy of leadership with whom the
government can build a relationship of trust, who know the
341. At some point, impediments to access to the regulatory process and courts
would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 748 (1983) (holding that an employer cannot be prevented from bringing
suit against an employee even if the employer's motive is antiunion animus prohib-
ited by the NLRA, as long as the employer has a "reasonable basis" for the suit);
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)
(stating that the right to petition protects sham litigation for anticompetitive purpos-
es from violating the antitrust laws unless the litigation is baseless and repetitive);
Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process,
74 N.C. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (1995) (prefacing suggestions for restricting access to ad-
ministrative proceedings by noting the potential limits imposed by the rights to peti-
tion and due process); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 15, 62 (1993) (arguing that aspects of Rule 11 violate the right to peti-
tion).
492 [Vol. 41:411
EMPOWERING STAKEHOLDERS
rules of the cooperative game, and who are committed to pro-
moting the consensus worked out by the collaborative process. 42
Unfortunately, however, democratic mechanisms for choosing
group representatives are appropriate and achievable only in
limited circumstances. 3
Beneficiary democracy poses challenges of its own. At the
outset, establishing a system for putative beneficiaries of regula-
tion to elect a representative will entail significant administra-
tive expense. Even once such a system is in place, election by
interested individuals may exclude representatives of subgroups
whose interests differ from those of the majority, but who are
willing to cooperate in a collaborative regulatory venture. Such
exclusion is especially likely to occur if the group voting for a
single representative includes individuals who are affected dif-
ferently by the conduct of the regulated firm. For example,
workers on an assembly line at a plant would have a different
interest in workplace health and safety than would a secretary
who works in an office at the same plant. Thus, beneficiary
democracy depends on establishing a system in which those with
dissimilar regulatory interests vote for separate representa-
tives." Such a system would require a regulator to determine
which individuals are similarly situated and therefore fall with-
in a single group entitled to choose a representative to the pro-
cess, as well as establishing procedures for members of each
such group to choose a leader who can participate in the process
342. A similar understanding of the need for the development of stable "peak
organizations" underlies any government interest in a corporatist system. See P.P.
CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 149 (1990) (noting how peak organizations allow for the develop-
ment of trust with the government, provide participants in governance who know
"the rules of the game," and promote a policy agreed upon by the organization and
the government).
343. Cf. JOHN GAsTIL, DEMOCRACY IN SMALL GROUPS: PARTICIPATION, DECISION
MAKING AND COMIiMUNICATION 6-10 (1993) (describing criteria for determining when a
small group productively might rely on democratic processes).
344. The difficulty of establishing a system for interest group democracy to limit
participation in collaborative regulatory endeavors is greatly increased by the fluidity
of group members' interests. See Rossi, supra note 122, at 245 (asserting that, to the
extent a representative "stand[s] for" others in the process, representation is "pre-
mised on a fundamental myth-that a group is defined by a static and uniform set
of interests that can be preidentified").
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and represent mainstream rather than fringe views.' Estab-
lishing such a system is a daunting regulatory task by itself.
Even if an appropriate group framework could be established,
elections would not guarantee that representatives would pursue
their constituents' interests faithfully. Representatives might
instead seek to increase their incumbency or power as represen-
tatives-an agency cost of having a representative system.' On
the one hand, agency costs of representation generally increase
as the familiarity of the representatives to their constituencies
345. Federal labor laws provide the best known example of the government at-
tempting to establish internal group democracy as a means of empowering group
members to exclude nonrepresentative factions from the process of negotiating regu-
lations. The regulated negotiations under the labor laws are collective bargaining
agreements, and the defined interest groups entitled to choose a representative to
participate in that process are collective bargaining units. See National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994) (requiring the NLRB to identify the unit appro-
priate for collective bargaining). Difficulties in establishing a system for the demo-
cratic governance of unions free from corruption illustrate the magnitude of the task
facing the government that attempts to establish such a system for self-policing of
representation in a collaborative rulemaking process. See Eric Ames Tilles, Note,
Union Receiverships Under RICO: A Union Democracy Perspective, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 929, 934-39 (1989) (using the sociology of group democracy to explain why
unions are oligarchic and concluding that merely providing the tools of democracy to
unions is insufficient to ensure that union leaders are truly representative of their
members). See generally George Kannar, Making the Teamsters Safe for Democracy,
102 YALE L.J. 1645 (1993) (describing the corruption and lack of democracy that
have plagued unions in the United States for over 100 years). In addition, the pro-
pensity for union-management negotiations to break down into adversarial processes
illustrates that even such a system will not guarantee effective collaborative regula-
tion. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 713-14 (1996) (asserting that the adversarial nature of
American labor relations makes the employment relationship seem like a "chicken
game" characterized by the issuance of ultimatums); Stanley Cherim, Bargaining
from Both Sides, GOV'T UNION REV., Winter 1984, at 47, 48 (calling collective negoti-
ation "an adversarial system of conflict resolution" that "divide[s people] into two
camps"); Paul F. Gerhart, Maintenance of the Union-Management Relationship, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 97, 101 (Jack Rabin et al. eds.,
1994) (finding that in the past 30 years, labor-management relations in the public
sector have evolved toward the adversarial model that has characterized private
sector relations); Ruth Tallakson & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Winning and Losing in Interest
Arbitration, in STRATEGIES FOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION 180, 180 (Harry Kershen &
Claire Meirowitz eds., 1992) (stating that "[a]lthough it is true that collective bar-
gaining often has a strong flavor of cooperativeness, there has also been an enduring
emphasis upon winning and losing").
346. See Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives from
Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93, 97 (1984).
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and the concomitant ability of the constituencies to influence the
representatives diminishes. 47 Thus, the problem of agency costs
of representation reinforces the need for beneficiaries to elect
representatives on a facility-by-facility basis. In that case, it is
most likely that a representative will be a member of the benefi-
ciary voting unit, and that the voters can more easily monitor
and constrain the actions of the representative. On the other
hand, small localized groups are more likely to harbor parochial
views and to refuse to accommodate competing perspectives. 8'
Thus, although leaders of a stakeholder group organized around
an individual facility are likely to act in accordance with group
members' desires, those desires often will be to resist achieving
collaborative consensus. Moreover, local chapters of interest
groups often lack the resources or expertise necessary to under-
stand the assertions of their industry counterparts, let alone to
verify the accuracy of those assertions regarding technically
complex matters. This suggests that empowerment may depend
on affiliation with a national group that can make available to
the representatives needed resources and information.
Finally, representation may become tainted if the regulated
firm can offer inducements to some voting members independent
of their regulatory interests. For example, in the context of
workplace health and safety, one should balk at a system that
allowed an employer to buy off worker representatives with job
perquisites or increased pay. One should also look askance at
any inducement offered to a select subgroup of the voting unit.
In both of these examples, the regulated firm essentially can
split the interests of the voting unit, and collude with one sub-
group against the overall beneficiary interest. Sweetheart regu-
347. See LEONARD R. SAYLES & GEORGE STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 148-49 (rev.
ed. 1967) (noting that the work of local unions is subject to close monitoring by
rank and file members); Tilles, supra note 345, at 937 (stating that "the larger and
more diverse the union, the greater the influence of the factors that lead to oligar-
chy").
348. The belief that local factions tend to be more extreme than national ones is
often cited as an insightful perception that the Federalists used to persuade citizens
of the original thirteen states to support the Constitution's national republican struc-
ture. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Accounts of grassroots environ-
mental organizations lend empirical support to Madison's perception. See GOTTLIEB,
supra note 279, at 170, 202-03; SHABECOFF, supra note 293, at 233-34.
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latory provisions are the likely result. The regulated firm's abili-
ty to offer such inducements increases when the relationship of
the firm to the beneficiaries involves multiple distinct issues. In
the example above, the problem occurs because the employee is
interested in more than just workplace safety, an interest she
shares with other members of the voting unit. The employee
may be interested in such independent matters as pay, other
working conditions, and opportunity for training and advance-
ment. Avoiding side inducements requires a system that defines
what the regulated firm may promise representatives or sub-
groups of voting units, and a means of policing against regulated
entity transgressions.
C. Conjectures About Particular Contexts in Which Collaborative
Regulation Might Work
The preceding analysis of mechanisms to ensure accountable
empowerment suggests that although beneficiary democracy
may work to limit empowerment to constructive contexts, setting
up such a democratic system will not be cheap. Moreover, even
after the system is established, it is only likely to work when
beneficiaries can be divided into groups with distinct regulatory
interests, on a facility-by-facility basis, and when those groups
maintain an ongoing relationship with the owner of the regulat-
ed facility and have access to expertise and resources, perhaps
through a relationship with a national interest group. Despite
these extensive prerequisites, there are contexts in which benefi-
ciary democracy might be feasible.
For example, Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that empower-
ment be tried for residents of nursing homes in Australia 49
They suggest that nursing home residents are among the most
powerless, so that if empowerment works in that context, it
would prove the pragmatic viability of the theory.350 The reason
residents of nursing homes may be powerless, however, lies in
349. See AYRES & BRAIT-VAITE, supra note 2, at 99.
350. Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that "[tihere is no group that . . . is more
difficult to empower than nursing home residents," and therefore the ability to im-
plement collaborative regulation of nursing homes would be a crucial case indicating
the strength of the theory of such regulation. See id.
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their physical or mental incapacity to pursue or protect their
own interests actively, rather than in any interest group pathol-
ogies. In fact, my analysis suggests that in those rare instances
when a significant proportion of nursing home residents are
capable of making and acting upon informed decisions about
their care, the nursing home setting in many ways provides an
arena well suited for effectuation of collaborative governance by
empowerment of residents. Regulations that vary from home to
home can easily be negotiated. Clearly, residents have an on-
going interest in the quality of care they receive from a facility.
In most instances there would be no need to divide residents
into various voting units because each resident shares a common
interest in quality of care. Those who may be more independent
today, and thus might favor regulation that gives them more
benefits at the expense of the more infirm, must worry that they
may find themselves in the less fortunate group in the near
future. Finally, nursing home operators generally share an inter-
nal norm of seeing that their residents are well cared for, even if
they also are pinched by the realities of the cost of providing
such care. In such a context, the chief challenges that empower-
ment must overcome are the actual communication of issues and
ideas to residents and the need to ensure that residents are
aware of the process, can understand where their interests lie,
and have some means of expressing those interests to represen-
tatives with some power in the regulatory process. For those
nursing homes that can overcome these challenges, contrary to
Ayres and Braithwaite's opinion, I see nursing homes as the
quintessential type of regulatory arena in which empowerment
can provide significant responsiveness to beneficiaries' needs.
Regulation of workplace safety is another broad area in which
collaborative regulation might be implemented successfully. Line
workers in a particular manufacturing plant all share a continu-
ing interest in safety at their plant. Moreover, union representa-
tion provides a mechanism for selecting worker participants in a
plant safety committee and for ensuring continued involvement
in such a committee. Thus, it is not surprising that the Califor-
nia Occupational Safety and Health Administration's experiment
with a cooperative workplace safety program at construction
sites was successful. The program established safety committees
at each of several construction sites. The committees included
20001
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two employer and two labor representatives.3 5' The labor repre-
sentatives were employees at the site chosen either by the secre-
tary of the local building trades council or by the workers at the
site. 52 The committees were not merely brought together to set
standards; they continued in existence to hear and act on com-
plaints about safety problems at the sites. Reports from the sites
indicated that workers were more willing to communicate safety
problems they perceived,353 and that accident rates at the experi-
mental sites were below those at similar sites that had not es-
tablished safety committees. 4
Whether successes with safety committees at particular con-
struction sites are illustrative of the potential for such commit-
tees to improve workplace safety regulation generally, however,
remains an open question. In many manufacturing settings, the
influence of national or regional unions alters the interaction
between labor and management that would otherwise exist. A
significant number of plants are unionized, 55 and those that are
not unionized usually operate in the shadow of potential union
representation.3 " National or regional union leaders recognize
the ability of such committees to reinforce organized workers'
commitment to the union, or to give nonunionized workers a
taste of interacting with employers as part of a collective unit.
357
351. See JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULA-
TION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 134 (1988).
352. See id. at 141.
353. See id. at 142-44.
354. See id. at 2-3
355. Currently, about 11% of manufacturing plants in the United States are
unionized. See Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor
Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 791, 810 (1998).
356. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 151-
54 (1984) (suggesting that competition with unionized firms results in nonunion
firms offering employees wages and benefits similar to those offered by nonunion
shops); Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation Is Required in a Declin-
ing Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 138 (1997) (noting that unorganized labor benefits indi-
rectly from the labor movement).
357. Hence, national labor unions have supported mandatory labor-management
safety committees in which labor representatives are selected by secret ballot of
employees in appropriately designated work units. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula
B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation,
and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 173, 180-93
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Union leaders have much to lose, however, if labor's representa-
tives on safety committees at unionized plants are selected by
means independent of the union representation of workers. Loy-
alties to local committees chosen outside of the union structure
may replace loyalties to the national union. This problem is
magnified when an employer retains discretion about whether to
form a committee or over the make-up of the committee because
such discretion provides a means for employers to instill or exac-
erbate antiunion sentiments in workers.35 Because the aura of
union-management adversarialism pervades the debate about
safety committees in the usual manufacturing plant,3 59 it would
(Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (describing union efforts in developing
and implementing employer-employee cooperative programs); Louise Sadowsky Brock,
Note, Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 810 (1997); see also AFL-CIO CoMM. ON THE EVOLUTION OF
WORK, THE CHANGING SITUATION OF WORKERS AND THEIR UNIONS 18-19 (1985) (not-
ing worker concerns with health and safety issues and reporting that several unions
have received positive membership response to "union-management programs afford-
ing greater worker participation in the decision-making process at the workplace").
358. It may be sufficient that the employer can falsely create the impression that,
even without a union, workers are effectively represented in disputes with manage-
ment. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohi-
bition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
125, 126 (1994) (labelling this basis for opposing worker committees as a "false
consciousness' rationale"). This rationale underlies the NLRA's current prohibition of
any employer influence over "any organization .. . in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994); see also 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (prohibiting employer domination of labor organizations). But cf
Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Government in Regulating the Workplace, 13 LAB. LAW.
1, 9-10 (1997) (questioning whether employer supported worker groups provide inade-
quate representation of workers' interests or discourage support for unions).
359. This debate is being played out in the legislative arena. Industry has sup-
ported the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1995, which was
passed by both houses of Congress but vetoed by President Clinton. See H.R. 743,
104th Cong. (1996); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1996); Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite
Pleas from Business for Passage, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at AA-1 (July 31,
1996). TEAM, however, "focused heavily on employer concerns and failed to ensure
that employers would not use worker committees to thwart union organizing efforts."
Craver, supra note 356, at 143. Those associated with the concerns of labor have
supported an alternative recommendation proposed by President Clinton's Commis-
sion on the Future of Worker Management Relations, better known as the Dunlop
Commission. See Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You on? My Team or My TFAM?:
The NLRA's Section 8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 366-69
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be difficult to implement a system for establishing committees
that were seen neither as antimanagement nor antiunion. Thus,
union opposition to employer backed labor-management safety
committees and industry opposition to committees whose labor
representatives are chosen by secret ballot, and whose informa-
tion regarding safety concerns at individual plants came from
sources other than the employer-sources that might include na-
tional unions-threaten the emergence of a truly collaborative
process for regulating workplace safety.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this Article indicates many potential problems
with empowerment of stakeholders as a means of creating col-
laborative government that are likely to limit its usefulness to
select regulatory contexts or experimental programs. Perhaps
the greatest such problem is the need to limit participation to
groups that will not undermine the collaborative nature of the
process without granting regulators or regulated entities the
ability to co-opt stakeholder involvement by controlling access to
the process. My analysis of interest group dynamics suggests
that even in the few contexts where collaborative regulation
might work, the government will have to create a mechanism for
interest group internal democracy, which will itself require a
substantial regulatory mechanism.
I do not mean to suggest that experimental programs pre-
mised on some notion of a collaborative endeavor by stakehold-
ers cannot be beneficial. Experimental programs can educate
regulators about flexible regulatory mechanisms that agencies
can then incorporate into more traditional regulatory structures.
The success of such programs, however, hinges on the ultimate
rejection of true collaboration by all affected stakeholders as the
basis of regulation. This rejection occurs by reliance on govern-
ment control over two aspects of such experimental programs.
(1997) (outlining the present state of worker-management relations throughout the
nation and suggesting which obstacles need to be overcome). See generally COMMIS-
SION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR &
U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT (1994) (reporting on the state of
worker-management relations in the United States).
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First, such programs rely on regulators to exclude groups that
have no interest or incentive to reach a consensus about the
public interest to prevent fringe extremist groups from sabotag-
ing such programs. Second, such programs place the ultimate
responsibility for adopting and implementing regulations in the
hands of government officials to ensure that proposals reached
by consensus of stakeholders further a broadly held conception
of the public interest. Thus, the analyses in this Article tend to
confirm my initial suspicions that reinventing government by
empowering stakeholders to engage in a collaborative regulatory
endeavor is unlikely to replace the traditional regulatory para-
digm in which government is the institution that identifies and
tries to achieve its vision of the public interest.
